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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE SALTAS. ) 
Plaintiff tmd Respondent. 
vs. 
DAVID _-\. _-\FFLECK. doing business 
under the name and stvle of D. A. No. 6173 
AFFLECK GROCERY." 1)
1 
Defendant 
KENNETH BUTTE. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Prrs. Tr. 
Page 
1 
Defendant's Abstract of Record 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
COMPLAINT 
Comes now the plaintiff above named and 
for cause of action against the above named de-
fendant complains, and alleges: 
1. That there does now exist and extend, and 
at all times hereinafter mentioned existed and 
extended, northerly and southerly through Salt 
Lake City, Utah, a paved highway known and 
designated as "K" Street, and there does also ex-
ist and extend, and at all times hereinafter men-
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Page 
tioned existed and extended, westerly and easterly 
through Salt Lake City, Utah, a paved and public 
highway known and designated as Third Avenue, 
and that said "K" Street and said Third A venue 
intersect and did so intersect one and another at 
all times hereinafter mentioned. 
2. That the plaintiff is the father of Spero 
George Saltas, deceased; that said Spero George 
Saltas, at the time of his death, was 30 years of 
age, and left no wife or issue surviving him; 
that the plaintiff herein is the sole heir at law 
of said deceased and the person entitled to bring 
this cause of action. 
3. That at all times hereinafter mentioned the 
defendant, David A. Affleck, was engaged in the 
general grocery business in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
doing business under the name and style of D. A. 
Affleck Grocery; and at all times hereinafter 
mentioned the defendant, Kenneth Butte, was an 
employee of the said defendant, David A. Affleck, 
and was the driver and operator of the automo-
bile hereinafter mentioned, owned by the defend-
ant, David A. Affleck, and which was being driven 
2 by said defendant, Kenneth Butte, for and in be-
half of said defendant, D. A. Affleck, in the scope 
of and in furtherance of the employment afore-
said. 
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4. That on or about the 27th day of January, 
1938. at Salt Lake C'ity. Utah. ut ubout tlw hour 
of 1 :30 o'clock P. M. of said day. the said Spero 
George Saltas was riding as a guest in an auto-
mobile driven and operated by one Gerald Franz, 
'Who was then and there driving said automobile 
in a northerly direction along· and upon said "K" 
Street and approaching and entering the inter-
section of said '"K'' Street and Third Avenue, in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. and said defendants were 
driving and operating an automobile in a westerly 
direction along and upon said Third Avenue and 
approaching and entering the intersection of said 
Third _\venue and said "K" Street, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah: that after the automobile in which 
said Spero George Saltas was riding had entered 
said intersection and had proceeded over the 
middle line of said intersection and while pro-
ceeding in a northerly direction, the said defend-
ants negligently, careless and recklessly, as here-
inafter more particularly set forth, did drive their 
said automobile into said intersection and upon 
and against the automobile being driven by said 
Gerald Franz, in which said Spero George Saltas 
was riding as a guest, and did strike said auto-
mobile on the right side and at approximately the 
rear half portion of the same with great force 
and violence, and did strike the said Spero George 
Saltas with great force and violence, and, thereby 
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the said Spero George Saltas did suffer serious in-
juries to his head and body and thereafter, by 
reason of said injuries, the said Spero George 
Saltas died the same day. 
5. That at all times hereinafter mentioned 
there were, and now are, in full foree and effect in 
Salt Lake City. Utah, certain Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, known as "Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City," passed, promulgated and pub-
lished by the authority of the Board of Com-
missioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, in 1934, Chap-
ter LIX of which relates to traffic and travel upon 
the streets of Salt Lake City and, among other 
provisions, it is provided as follows, to wit: Sec-
tion 1345 (CC) and (DD) provides and fixes the 
business districts and the residence districts of 
and within Salt Lake City, Utah, and said Sec-
tion 1345 (DD), defining the residence district, 
defines and describes the same as the territory 
within Salt Lake City, Utah, other than the busi-
n~ss districts of Salt Lake City, Utah; that said 
Section 1345 (CC), defining the residence districts 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, defines the same as the 
territory that does not embrace the street known 
as Third A venue, extending from "J" to "L" 
Streets, and does not embrace "K .. Street between 
Second Avenue and Fourth Avenue, in said city, 
and the intersection of said Third A venue and 
"K" Street is within the residence ~istrict of Salt 
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Lake City, Utah. Section l3H~ (B) of said chapter 
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person 
to drive a vehicle in Salt Lake City. Utah. in any 
residence district. in excess of twenty-five miles 
per hour. Section 1382 (a) of said chapter pro-
vides and reads as follows: 
"RESTRICTIONS AS TO SPEED. 
Penalty. (a) It shall be unlawful for any 
person to drive a vehicle upon any street 
in Salt Lake City at a speed greater than 
is reasonable and prudent, having due re-
gard to the traffic, surface and width of 
the highway and the hazard at intersec-
tions and any other conditions existing. 
"Nor shall any person drive at a speed 
which is greater than will permit the driver 
to exercise proper control of the vehicle 
and to decrease speed or to stop, as may be 
necessary to avoid colliding with any per-
son, vehicle or other conveyance upon or 
entering the highway in compliance with 
legal requirements and with the duty of 
drivers and other persons using the street 
to exercise due care." 
6. That said defendants were careless and 
negligent as aforesaid in the following particulars: 
(a) In driving their said automobile at a 
speed greater than was reasonable and safe and 
at a rate of speed which was dangerous to life, 
limh and property, to wit: at a rate in excess of 
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8 
40 miles per hour and tn violation of said Sec-
tions 1345 (DD), 1382 (B) and 1382 (a); 
(b) In not having at said time and place 
the said automobile under immediate control; 
(c) In not according to the Franz automobile 
the right of way over said intersection; 
(d) In failing to use due care or caution for 
the safeguard of others by then and there failing 
and omitting to keep a careful lookout, or any 
lookout whatever, for other vehicles or cars along 
and upon said "K" Street and in approaching said 
intersection; 
(e) In not turning their said automobile to 
the left when there was ample space to have 
passed at the rear of the Franz automobile with-
out striking the same; 
(f) In failing to apply the brakes to said 
automobile and slowing down the same while ap-
proaching said intersection; in failing to have 
said brakes in proper working condition and in 
driving with defective brakes; 
(g) In that defendants saw, or by the exer-
cise of reasonable care should have seen the auto-
mobile in which deceased was riding and should 
have avoided striking him with their automobile. 
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7. That nt tlu.· time of his death tht• suid 
Spero George Salt as was 30 yeurs of ugt•: that he 
lived at the home of the plaintiff: that he wus 
healthy. Yigorous. intelligent. and of attractive 
character and disposition. and of great assistance. 
aid and comfort to the plaintiff; that he was em-
ployed by the Utah Copper Company and earn-
ing good wages in the sum of approximately 
$1 7'5.00 per month. That in consequence of the 
death of said Spero George Saltas, the plaintiff 
has been, and will continue to he, deprived of 
his services, assistance, society and comfort, and 
plaintiff has thereby sustained damage in the sum 
of fifteen thousand ($15,000) dollars. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment 
5 against the defendants, and each of them, in the 
sum of fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) dollars, and 
for costs of this action. 
H. G. METOS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
(Duly verified by George Saltas) 
13 (Title of Court and Cause) 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT, KENNETH BUTTE 
Comes now Kenneth Butte, one of the de-
fendants herein, and answering plaintiff's com-
plaint admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
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1. Answering paragraph 1 defendant admits 
the allegations therein contained. 
2. Answering paragraph 2 defendant alleges 
that he has not sufficient information or knowl-
edge to enable him to form a belief as to the 
truth or falsity of the allegations therein con-
tained and upon such grounds and for such reason 
denies said allegations. 
3. Answering paragraph 3 defendant admits 
that he was engaged by the defendant. David A. 
Affleck, to operate a grocery delivery truck in 
the business of the said David A. Affleck, but 
denies that at the time said accident occurred he 
was acting within the course and scope of his em-
ployment and in furtherance of any business of 
the said David A. Affleck, but on the contrary 
alleges the fact to be that prior to said accident 
he had completed deliveries which he then had 
in his truck and it was then time for him to go to 
lunch; that he met two girls and consented to take 
them down town; that after having so completed 
his deliveries and it being his lunch period he 
took said girls into his truck and started for the 
business district of Salt Lake City proceeding 
west on 3d Avenue; that at said time he had no 
further deliveries to make for his employer until 
after lunch. had no packages in his truck for 
14 delivery and had no purpose for his employer in 
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proceeding to tht' husint'ss distrid of Salt Luke 
City; that said trip wus mudt' soldy for the bene-
fit of this defendant and the two girls so being 
transported by him as aforesaid. That defendant's 
employer's place of business was located on 2d 
A venue and T Street in Salt Lake City and this 
defendant was proceeding west on 3d Avenue and 
was about to cross the intersection of 3d Avenue 
and K Street when the accident occurred. 
4. Answering paragraph 4 this defendant 
denies the allegations of negligence therein set 
forth and denies that the accident at said inter-
section was proximately caused by any negligence 
on the part of this defendant and alleges the fact 
to he that he was proceeding in a westerly direc-
tion on 3d Avenue in a careful and prudent man-
ner and with due regard to the condition of the 
highway and the traffic thereon and as he ap-
poached K Street he looked and saw no auto-
mobiles proceeding in either a northerly or south-
erly direction upon said street, hut as he was 
about to enter said intersection he saw a north-
hound automobile entering said intersection from 
the south which said automobile was traveling at 
an excessive, dangerous and unlawful rate of 
speed, to wit: at a rate of speed in excess of thirty 
miles an hour; that the driver of said automobile 
failed and neglected to observe the automobile 
truck which this defendant was operating, and 
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carelessly and negligently failed to yield the right 
of way to the automobile of this defendant which 
first entered said intersection or which entered 
said intersection at the same time said northbound 
automobile entered the same, and the driver of 
said northbound automobile carelessly and negli-
gently failed to slacken the speed of said automo-
bile or otherwise control or attempt to control the 
same to avoid running into this defendant and see-
ing and appreciating that said northbound auto-
mobile was not intending to stop or yield the right 
of way this defendant applied the brakes upon the 
automobile which he was then and there oper-
ating and endeavored to stop or control the same 
and avoid being run into by said northbound 
automobile and did slacken the speed thereof and 
15 did endeavor to avoid being so hit, but was unable 
in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care to 
avoid striking said automobile. That the accident 
described in plaintiff's complaint was solely 
caused by the carelessness and negligence of the 
driver of the automobile in which the deceased, 
Spero George Saltas, was riding. 
5. Answering paragraph 5 of plaintiff's com-
plaint defendant admits that at the time and place 
described in said complaint there was in full 
force and effect certain ordinances of Salt Lake 
City relating to traffic and travel upon the streets 
of Salt Lake City, including the ordinances limit-
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ing the speed of automobiles in tlw residential 
district in Salt Lakt• City to 2> milt•s an hour. an 
ordinance prohibiting the operation of an automo-
bile at a speed greater than will permit the driver 
to exercise proper control of said vehicle, and de-
fendant further alleges that at all times mentioned 
in said complaint there was in full force and effect 
a city ordinance described as Section 13?2 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, which or-
dinance, among other things. provides as follows: 
.. ,Yhen two -vehicles enter an intersec-
tion at the same time the driver of the 
vehicle on the left shall yield to the driver 
on the right." 
That this defendant entered said intersection of 
Third A venue and K Street prior to or at the same 
time that the automobile in which the deceased 
was riding entered said intersection from the left 
and this defendant was entitled to and did have 
the right of way at said intersection, but the driver 
of the automobile in which said deceased was rid-
ing carelessly and negligently failed to comply 
with said ordinances and the accident described 
in plaintiff's complaint was solely caused by such 
failure and by the carelessness and negligence of 
such driver in driving and operating his said auto-
mobile at a dangerous, excessive and unlawful 
rate of speed, in driving and operating his said 
automobile without keeping a careful, or any, 
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14 
lookout for other vehicles upon said highway, in 
driving and operating his said automobile with-
out keeping the same under safe, immediate, or 
any, control, in driving and operating said auto-
mobile in such a manner and at such a rate of 
speed that he could not and did not observe the 
automobile operated by this defendant and avoid 
an accident and in failing to also operate it with 
due regard to the condition of the highway, the 
traffic thereon and the visibility at the intersec-
tion where said accident occurred, and in failing 
to use re~sonable, or any, care or caution for the 
safety of persons upon said highway. 
6. Answering paragraph 6 defendant denies 
each and every allegation of negligence therein 
contained and with respect to said allegations al-
leges that the accident described in plaintiff's 
complaint was solely caused by the carelessness 
and negligence of the driver of the other auto-
mobile, all as herein set forth. 
7. Answering paragraph "! defendant denies 
that plaintiff was damaged in the manner or to 
the extent therein alleged. 
8. Defendant denies generally and specifical-
ly each and every material allegation in said com-
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plaint contained not heretofore or hereafter ad-
mitted, denied or qualified. 
GERALD IRVINE, 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Kenneth Butte. 
(Duly ~·erified by Kenneth Butte) 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-FIRST TRIAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 19th day 
of May, 1938, at the hour of 10 o'clock A. M., the 
above entitled matter came on for first trial before 
the Honorable .Allen G. Thurman, one of the judges 
of the above entitled court, sitting with a jury. H. 
G .. Metos appeared as attorney for plaintiff and 
Gerald Irvine appeared as attorney for the de-
fendant, Kenneth Butte, and Ralph T. Stewart 
appeared as attorney for the defendant, David 
A. Affleck. 
A jury was called, sworn, examined and 
chosen to try the case. 
247 DAVID A. AFFLECK, one of the defendants, 
was sworn and testified as to the relationship of 
principal and agent existing between himself and 
the defendant, Kenneth Butte. 
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16 
G. M. HOPKINS, police officer, testified as 
follows: 
I arrived at Third Avenue and K Street 
approximately 1:35 P. M. and saw the automo-
biles. I found a truck turned over on its left side 
facing east on the northwest corner of the inter-
section. K Street is 45 feet wide. Third Avenue 
is 45 feet wide. At point X there was consider-
able debris in the street. Leading from that point 
eastward was a heavy drag mark. A burned tire 
mark was leading to this debris 36 feet long, 
caused by a tire moving sideways. Said tire 
264 burn led to the truck on the northwest corner. 
We found the Ford Coupe sitting in this position 
'265 headed in a northwest direction. At the north-
west corner is a utility pole with a small tree 
four inches in diameter. There is a large tree 
about sixteen inches in diameter. Between the 
tree and the curb is grass. Leading across that 
grass were two tire marks. The grass was torn 
up leading right up nearly to the tree. There were 
dirt marks leading back to the position of the 
Ford. Along the sidewalk was a considerable 
272 amount of blood. The distance from point X where 
the debris was to the tree was 45 feet. 
275 ERNEST H. CHRISTENSEN, police officer, 
testified as follows: 
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I received a eull about l :40 P . .M. und pro-
ceeded to the scene of the accident. I helped make 
the measurements testified to by Officer Hopkins 
and took photographs. 
280 GERALD _-\. FRANZ, driver of the car m 
281 which deceased was riding. testified as follows: 
I am a Union Pacific stage driver and was 
acquainted with S. G. Saltas. I had a 1936 Ford 
Coupe. I was driving north on K Street and Mr. 
282 Saltas was sitting next to me. As we approached 
Third A venue I lost sufficient speed so I shifted 
into second gear and started on across the inter-
section. As we got into the intersection I noticed 
a truck approaching from the east. I was prac-
tically in the center of the intersection at the time 
I saw the truck. When I saw it I should judge it 
was 100 feet east and I believed I could beat it 
across the intersection. I tried to go across the in-
tersection and when I was practically across he 
struck me on the rear part of my car on the right 
side. When I saw the other car I was practically in 
285 the center of Third A venue. I was probably 25 
feet north of the south curb of Third Avenue. 
Before I approached the intersection I suppose I 
286 looked to the right. After I got into the intersection 
where I indicated here I see this truck coming 
possibly 100 or 110 feet up the east side of the 
288 intersection. We were going no particular place, 
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1S 
just riding around. T had no intention of turning 
at Third A venue and had proceeded three blocks 
up K Street before the accident occurred. I first 
saw this Ford truck coming west when I was 
approximately 20 or 25 feet north of the south 
curb line on Third Avenue. I had reached a 
point nearly in the center of Third A venue when 
I first saw the Ford truck coming and at no time 
prior to reaching a point approximately in the cen-
ter of Third A venue did I see the Ford truck. I 
would say I was 10 or 15 feet south of the south 
curb line of Third Avenue when I looked east. I 
didn't notice anything or I would have slowed 
292 down or stopped. When I was about 10 or 15 
feet south of the south curb line I looked east and 
saw no car coming. When I was 10 or 15 feet 
south of the south curb line I don't know how far 
east I could see. I had a clear vision east. I never 
293 at any time applied my brakes. My car traveled 
from a point 25 feet north of the south curb line 
to the point of the accident while the truck travel-
294 ed 100 feet. My car traveled 10 or 12 feet while 
the other car traveled 100 feet. My car was going 
between 15 and 20 miles an hour. 
322 GEORGE SAL TAS, plaintiff, testified as 
follows: 
323 I live in Bingham. Spero Saltas was my son, 30 
years old. My wife died in 1934. I have six child-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pff"s. Tr. 
Pa~ 
326 
327 
328 
329 
19 
ren living with mt' und one girl is married. lit.• 
was working for tlu.' Utah Coppt.'l' ns u mu('hinist. 
Spero Saltas lived with me in my house. Spero 
helped me out. He helped me at all times. That is 
the only boy I had to help me. I was besides an 
old man. be sick. not do anything, he do for me, 
except to keep a little money for his expenses 
and otherwise he worked for me. He was the only 
one that helped. I had four boys going to school, 
nobody else worked, two girls, same thing, and he 
only worked to keep the family, Spero did. The 
332 only time he go out was last year. He go to Yellow-
stone Park and to California because he make 
333 some money. Spero purchased a car. Gave $300 
for the car and have worked and paid payments. 
I have worked in Bingham thirty years for the 
334 Utah Copper and United States Mine. I have 
worked regularly for that time except in 1936 when 
I laid off for a while. I am working regularly now 
and worked regularly in 1937. I have worked regu-
larly for thirty years except in 1936. I have been 
336 working regularly since 1924 except in 1936 when 
I was sick. My married girl doesn't live at home. 
She is 34 years old. Her husband is working. She 
337 worked before she got married. My next girl is 23. 
She stays home and does all things for us, keeps 
house. If she finds work she goes to work. My next 
girl is 22. My next boy is Paul. He is 21. He works 
338 for the Utah Copper. He has worked for the Utah 
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Copper about two years. He lives at home and 
helps me sometimes. My next boy is Pete. He 
works for the B. & G. Railroad and is 20. He 
has been working about eighteen months and lives 
at home. Paul earns $5.00 a day. Pete earns $3.65. 
The one next t~ Pete is Tom. He is 17 and goes to 
school. The next one is Alex and he goes to school. 
Paul lives at home and earns $5.00 a day. He is 
340 now working 22 days a month. Pete earns $3.65. 
I make $4.25 a day for 22 days a month. The 
total income for myself and the two boys is about 
$13.00 a day except when we are only working 
22 days a month. Spero told me and my wife that 
341 he would not get married until the other boys 
were old enough to step in and help. Maybe some 
342 time he would get married. I have a considerable 
sum of money in the bank. 
344 Plaintiff rested and defendant, KENNETH 
BUTTE, introduced evidence as follows: 
KENNETH BUTTE testified as follows: 
My name is Kenneth Butte and I am 25 
years old. I live at 173 Q Street and was employed 
by D. A. Affleck Grocery. I traveled west on Third 
355 Avenue and stopped at N Street for the stop 
sign. I then proceeded west on Third A venue to 
K Street. As I approached K Street I slowed down. 
356 I looked to the left and saw this car coming just 
as T entered the intersection. He was maybe 15 
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feet south of the intersection. 1 snw he was :wt 
going to stop or slow down so I put on my brakes 
and swerved to the right then we collided. As I 
entered the intersection I was g·oing about 20 or 
25 miles an hour. I turned north. I saw he wasn't 
going to stop. he wa~ coming at a pretty good 
rate of speed and I tried to go parallel with him. 
He did not slaken his speed or put on his brakes. 
I figured he was going between 35 and 45 miles 
an hour. \\'hen I first saw him he was 15 or 20 
feet south of the south intersection on Third 
357 ~-\-venue. I ·was about at the figure 6 when I first 
saw him coming. I swerved and he just kept on 
coming and my car was in a northwest position 
when the cars hit and that whipped the rear end 
of my truck around, threw my truck on its side 
and the coupe kept going in a northwesterly di-
rection, hit into a tree and then rolled back down. 
359 My car was in good mechanical condition and the 
brakes were good. I was observing as I drove down 
360 Third A venue. The car coming north on K Street 
did not make any turn either to the left or the 
right to avoid an accident. It did not increase or 
decrease speed. I estimate it was traveling be-
tween 35 and 40 miles an hour. Jt continued 
straight on through the intersection. My truck en-
tered the intersection first. 
346 In making my deliveries a route was pre-
pared by the manager for me to follow. Mr. Af-
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the way in which I was to make them, and I was 
to take those orders in the order set out and fol-
low from one customer to another in the order Mr. 
Affleck set out the list of orders on the route. On 
the completion of each route my duty was then to 
come back to the the store and unload the truck 
and get ready to take the next trip, and this pro-
cess is continued all day long. There was only 
one seat in the car, just behind the steering 
348 wheel, for the driver. Mr. Affleck had prepared 
a route for me to follow on this particular de-
349 livery on this day as he had done on previous 
occasions. The orders were to the east end of the 
avenues, Federal Heights, and Military Drive. The 
last place I was to visit was 1326 Third Avenue. 
The store is located on T Street and Second Ave-
nue, and east of that you go up to Virginia Street 
and up to Federal Heights and Military Drive, 
350 Arlington Drive and up there. The store where I 
work is located east and south from K Street 
and Third A venue. Beginning with K Street go-
ing in an easterly direction, each street running 
parallel with K Street is given an alphabetical 
letter in succession. There are nine letters between 
"K" and "T." The avenues are numbered First 
Avenue, Second Avenue, Third Avenue, and so on, 
running from south to north. K Street and Third 
351 Avenue, in my judgment is about a half mile from 
352 the store. The store knew practically where I 
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would be all the time. In other words, my em-
ployer was conserving my time as much as pos-
sihle, taking the deliveries in the order that would 
make the shortest run and they could keep track 
of where I was at all times. On the one o'clock 
route on January 27th I had five deliveries to 
make. I made them in the order that Bird Af-
fleck had given them to me. The fourth delivery 
was made at 13?9 Third A venue. After I made 
the fourth delivery I saw two young ladies on Mil-
itary Drive and Third A venue. Military Drive 
is one block east of Alta Street and is east of the 
353 Affleck store. that is about four blocks east and 
one block north of the store. The last delivery 
was also east of the store. They asked me if I 
was going down town, and I said, "No, but it 
is my noon hour, I guess I can take you down." 
Then I proceeded to the Travers home, 1326 Third 
Avenue, and made my last delivery. After I had 
completed that delivery I had no more groceries 
355 or deliveries to make. That was the last delivery. 
From the place where I picked up the young ladies 
to the place of the last delivery was about two-
thirds of one of the smaller blocks. Then I pro-
ceeded west on Third A venue, passed the store 
where I was employed, except the store is on 
Second A venue. The five deliveries I mentioned 
were all east of the store. I did not have any de-
liveries to make for any place west of T Street. 
362 When I left the store to make those deliveries, 
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there was no other place than to those five cus-
tomers that r was to go for Affleck, and I had 
not been instructed to go any place except to make 
those five deliveries. I had no business for the 
store or for Mr. Affleck west of T Street and had 
no business to go west as far as K Street, or in 
that vicinity. I had no business for the Affleck 
store or for Mr. D. A. Affleck or his son that call-
ed upon me to go down to the business section of 
Salt Lake City. I was driving west on Third Ave-
nue and K Street just to take the two girls down 
town. r did not have any other business what-
soever in proceeding west of T Street on Third 
363 A venue except to take the two girls down town. 
When I was employed on January 18, 193'7, Bird 
Affleck gave me my instructions, and told me 
364 how I was to make the deliveries. He told me to 
take the deliveries out and then come back to the 
store with the empty truck; that there would not 
be any monkey business on the job. He told me 
I wasn't supposed to ride anyone in the truck. 
He said to not even ride members of his family 
in the truck without specific permission. He told 
me the truck was not to be used for anything but 
the purpose of the store, and not to be used for 
my own purpose. He explained to me the matter 
of routing and lining up my deliveries on the par-
ticular routes and that he would line up the 
order in which the deliveries were to be made 
365 and told me that I was to follow such routes. He 
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told me that upon eompleting a delivery route, L 
was to come directly back to the store. While I 
was working at the store. I ate at the store all 
the time and did not go home for lunch. He told 
me I should never carry passengers in the truck 
or to take anyone into the truck but myself, and 
that was the purpose of having only one seat in 
366 the truck for the driver alone. After making my 
367 last delivery I had no other merchandise in the 
truck, and it was my duty to go directly back to 
the store on Second Avenue and T Street, but 
368 instead I proceeded west on Third A venue. That 
was the first time that I had ever taken any pass-
engers in the truck. 
374 Q. In other words, when you had three or 
four deliveries to make they would give you the 
names and addresses and you would go ahead and 
make the deliveries? 
A. They would give them to me enrouted, in 
routed order. 
Q. But you had your choice on which street 
you would take? 
A. I wasn't supposed to go out of the way 
to get to a house. 
384 At the time I was driving down Third Ave-
nue toward K Street, I was not going to get any 
gas. 
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D. B. AFFLECK testified as follows: 
My name is D. B. Affleck and I am the man-
ager of Affleck's Grocery Store, and have charge 
of the employment of people working for the 
store. It is part of my duty to supervise, direct, 
and instruct the employees. I explained to Mr. 
Butte that the orders would be boxed and routed, 
and he was to take these orders and deliver them 
without changing the route whatsoever, and that 
under no circumstances was he ever to take any 
391 riders without specific instruction from the store. 
I did not even allow my son to ride with him. He 
was to take the orders as routed and where they 
were routed, and immediately upon the last order 
being delivered he was to come back to the store. 
He was not to use the truck for any purpose ex-
cept for the business of the store, unless I gave 
him specific instructions to do so. I routed the 
393 particular trip Mr. Butte took prior to the acci-
dent. Butte was to make five deliveries, all to the 
east and south of the store. I did not authorize 
him to go any place in the vicinity of K Street 
and Third Avenue and Mr. Butte had no purpose 
whatsoever at that time and while he was out on 
that delivery in going any place west'of T Street 
in the business of the D. A. Affleck Grocery. I 
did not authorize or instruct him to go to any 
place in the vicinity of K Street and Third Ave-
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nue, nor did I authorize him to go any place west 
of T Street. 
RAY VAN NOY testified as follows: 
I live at ?65 Third A venue just east of L 
Street. The blocks are small. I am City License In-
385 spector. I am a city police officer. I had gone home 
for lunch that day. When I completed lunch I went 
out to my automobile parked at the curb. It was 
facing west on the north side of L Street. I ob-
served Mr. Mfleck's truck going west as it pro-
ceeded to K Street. I saw the crash. I got in my 
386 car and went down to the collision. It was a little 
over a block to the scene of the accident. I saw 
the truck as it passed me until it got to L Street. 
387 It continued to L Street at about the same speed 
as when it passed me. It was traveling between 20 
and 25 miles an hour. I have no connection with 
388 Mr. Affleck. 
The court directed a verdict in favor of the 
25-26 defendant, David A. Affleck, and against the plain-
tiff and thereafter the jury was instructed and the 
case against the defendant Kenneth Butte, was 
argued to the jury, which returned a unanimous 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant, Kenneth Butte, for the sum of $800.00. 
92 Thereafter and on the 26th day of May, 1938, 
plaintiff served and filed his notice of intention 
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to move for a new trial, setting forth, among other 
grounds, the following: "5. Inadequate damages 
appearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice." On the 18th day of July, 
1938, plaintiff's motion for a new trial was argued. 
Defendant produced jurors John Haddow and 
Werner Kiepe, who testified as to the manner of 
reaching the verdict, and the court made the fol-
lowing statement: 
"THE COURT: So far as the quotient ver-
dict is concerned I am inclined to hold against 
Mr. Metos. As to his motion for a new trial, that 
there is evidence to go to the jury, I am inclined 
to rule against him on that. I am inclined to think 
at this time that the verdict is too low. I do not 
mean to say by that that I will find it too low, 
but the matter will be taken under advisement." 
119 Thereafter and on the 2nd day of March, 1939, 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial as to the defend-
ant, David A. Affleck, was denied and the court 
made an order that the motion for a new trial 
as to the defendant, Kenneth Butte, be granted 
unless said defendant, within twenty days after 
notice, consent that the verdict of the jury ren-
dered against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, and 
in favor of the plaintiff, be increased to $2400.00 
and that judgment for such amount be entered 
against said defendant, Kenneth Butte, and in fa-
vor of the plaintiff, and that should the said 
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Kenneth Butte so consent that the motion for a 
new trial as to said defendant be denied, but 
otherwise granted. That notice of such order was 
served upon the defendant, Kenneth Butte, on the 
3rd day of March, 1939, but said Kenneth Butte 
failed to consent to the increase of such verdict. 
124 That on the 3rd day of April, 1939, defendant, 
Kenneth Butte, served and filed his notice and 
motion as follows: 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
~OTICE AND MOTION 
TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED AND TO 
H. G. METOS, HIS ATTORNEY: 
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE 
TAKE NOTICE that the defendant, Kenneth 
Butte, will on the 11th day of April, 1939, at the 
hour of 2 o'clock P. M., or as soon thereafter as 
counsel can be heard, move the court to vacate 
and set aside its conditional order heretofore en-
tered herein providing that the defendant, Butte, 
shall consent that the judgment against him be in-
creased to $2400.00 within twenty days after no-
tice of such order or in the alternative that the 
judgment against said defendant be set aside and 
a new trial granted. 
This motion is and will be based upon the 
files, records, evidence and minutes in the above 
entitled cause and the following grounds: 
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1. That the court had no authority to make 
such alternative order. 
2. That the verdict against the defendant, 
Kenneth Butte, was not insufficient. 
3. That the jury having fairly upon the evi-
dence presented returned a verdict for the sum of 
$800.00, the court could not set up its judgment, 
opinion or feeling as against the verdict and 
judgment of the jury. 
4. That said order was made contrary to law. 
GERALD IRVINE, 
Attorney for Kenneth Butte. 
127 That said motion was duly argued to the 
court and denied on the 17th day of April, 1939. 
Oft's. Tr. 
Page 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
8 BILL OF EXCEPTIONS ON SECOND TRIAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of 
May, 1939, the above entitled matter came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Clarence E. Baker, 
one of the judges of the above entitled court, sit-
ting with a jury. H. G. Metos and Samuel Bern· 
stein appeared as attorneys for plaintiff and Ger· 
ald Irvine and Ralph T. Stewart appeared as at· 
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torneys for the ddendant, whereupon the fol-
lowing proceedings were had: 
11 MR. S l.E \\ A1{ 1 : 1 have another matter 1 
might call Your Honor's attention to at this time, 
and that is the order made by judge Thurman 
,,;ith respect to the new trial. 
Judge Thurman. on March 2, 1939, made an 
order. which I am taking the substance of from 
the notice served on me. not having the original 
order before me. and which order read substan-
tially as follows: 
(~1\Jternative order to increase the verdict to 
$2400.00 or grant a new trial was read). 
12 ~ow, it not appearing from the record In this 
case that any order has been made since the ex-
piration of twenty days, determining that con-
sent was not given and the granting of the motion 
because of the fact that such consent was not 
given, we object to the case proceeding to trial, 
on the ground that there is already a verdict in 
this case for $800.00, and that a motion for a new 
trial was not legally granted, and that therefore 
there is no issue to be tried. We further object to 
the case proceeding to trial as against the defend-
ant, Kenneth Butte, only, and not as against both 
defendants. 
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\Ve take the position on behalf of Kenneth 
Butte that his rights would be seriously prejudiced 
by having this case as against him alone, tried 
separately. He is put in a position where a ver-
dict or judgment might be rendered against him 
in one amount, whereas on a possible retrial as 
against the defendant, Affleck, would change the 
verdict-or a verdict in a different amount might 
be rendered, and if. upon a subsequent trial as 
against the defendant, Affleck, a verdict in ex-
cess of the amount rendered against the defend-
ant, Kenneth Butte, was entered, the said Affleck 
would have a cause of action against Butte for an 
amount in excess of any judgment or verdict which 
might be rendered in this case. 
13 MR. METOS: Now, if the court please, all 
17 
18 
those matters Mr. Stewart talked about were 
ruled upon last week by Judge Thurman. 
THE COURT: I will go over this between 
now and 2 P. M. and reserve the ruling upon it 
until that time. 
MR .. MET OS: I don't know whether an entry 
has been made, but the judge, in open court, over-
ruled those objections. 
THE COURT: I assume that the order in-
dicates the objection has been ruled upon. It is 
the opinion of this court that the order, without 
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any further order. is binding and ubsolutl'. The 
motion is. therefore. at this time Ol'nit'cl. 
You may draw the jury. 
MR. STEWART: There is one matter I 
want to take up before commencing the examina-
tion of the jury. either now, or after the names 
have been drawn. it is immaterial to me at which 
time hut before the commencement of any exam-
ination. 
THE COURT: Can you state to me what it 
it, Mr. Stewart? 
MR. STEWART: If Your Honor please, at 
this time I wish to offer in evidence Policy No. 
AU-206787, issued by the Northwest Casualty 
Company, on the 28th day of September, 1937, 
and covering the period when this accident oc-
curred, being a policy issued to D. A. Affleck, 
doing business as Affleck Grocery Company. The 
19 purpose of the introduction is to show to the court 
the fact that the coverage under the policy is not 
extended in this action to the defendant, Kenneth 
Butte, hut is limited to persons driving the car for 
purposes of Mr. Affleck; so as to advise the court, 
in advance, that there is no insurance in this case, 
and that it would he prejudicial to the defendant, 
Kenneth Butte, if any matter relating to insurance 
should he brought out in this action. It is purely 
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for this purpose. and no other purpose. 
MR: BERNSTEIN: If we get a judgment against 
Kenneth Butte and an execution issues that is not 
satisfied, and we make demand on the insurance 
company, then we would have to file suit against 
this insurance company, and we are entitled to 
ask Your Honor, and we are going to ask Your 
Honor, to ask this jury whether or not they carry 
liability insurance, and we can ask the jury if 
they own stock in this company. The Supreme 
Court has ruled we have a right to ask this ques-
tion. 
MR. METOS: The court may tell the jury, 
and ask them whether or not they carry liability 
insurance. 
MR. STEW ART: I want the paragraph to 
appear in the record, and if the court rules it is 
not properly there, I cannot help that,-with re-
spect to this paragraph which I offer to read. 
MR. STEWART: I will be glad to have the 
reporter copy it, as though it had been read in the 
record, this provision of paragraph 5, and particu-
larly the last portion of it, which reads as follows: 
"provided, further, that the actual use is with the 
permission of the named insured." 
THE COURT: Well, it may be received 
solely for the purpose offered, hut at this time 
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the ruling on any number of possible questions 
that might he asked in regard to the question will 
be ruled on hereafter. It is not an exhibit for the 
jury. 
MR. BERNSTEIN: I don't understand the 
court has a right to admit anything in evidence 
unless it is shown to the jury. 
MR. METOS: In other words, is Your Honor 
22 going to rule that in the event the plaintiff asks 
these jurors whether they are connected with the 
Northwest Casualty Company, Your Honor will 
sustain an oh jection to those questions? 
THE COURT: That is not the court's rul-
ing at this time. 
23 Thereupon the jurors returned to the court-
room and after examination by the court were 
examined by Mr. Metos as follows: 
Q: Mr. Langton, are you a stockholder or 
officer or employee of the Northwest Casualty 
Company of Seattle, Washington? 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. James L. Wilson, are you a stock-
holder or officer or employee of any casualty com-
pany? 
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A. No. The company I am with writes cas-
ualty insurance; that is the First Security Trust. 
I have no stock in the corporation. 
Q. Mr. Self, are you a stockholder-by the 
way, what did you say your employment was? 
A. A salesman. 
Q. For whom? 
A. For myself. 
Q. Are you a stockholder, officer or em-
ployee of the Northwest Casualty Company? 
A. No. 
Q. Or any casualty company? 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. Groo, where are you employed? 
A. Roe's Department Store, Third South 
and State. 
Q. Are you a stockholder or officer or em-
ployee of the Northwest Casualty Company of 
Seattle, Washington? 
A. No. 
Q. Or any other casualty company? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Mrs. Andrus,-are you married? 
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A. Yes sir. 
Q. What is your husband's business? 
A. He is a salesman at the Producers Mar-
ket. 
26 Q. ~-\.re you a stockholder. officer or em-
ployee of the Northwest Casualty Company of 
Seattle. "' ashington? 
_-\. ,\ly husband just bought a car, and he 
·would have insurance. but I don't think it is that 
company. 
Q. ,\Ir. McCowan, what is your occupation? 
A. I am the district manager of the Libby, 
:\:fcNeil & Company-food products. 
Q. Are you a stockholder or officer or em-
ployee of the Northwest Casualty Company of 
Seattle, Washington. 
A. No sir. 
Q. Or any other casualty company? 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. Lalliss, are you, yourself, employed? 
A. Yes. 
27 Q. Are you a stockholder or officer or em-
ployee of the Northwest Casualty Company of 
Seattle, Washington? 
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No sir. 
Or any other company? 
No. 
Mr. Booth, do you drive an automobile? 
f have driven one, but T haven't a car 
You say you work for the U.S. Smelter? 
T am a tailor, I make the bags. 
Q. Are you a stockholder or officer or em-
ployee of the Northwest Casualty Company of 
Seattle, Washington? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Or any other casualty company? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Mr. Timothy, do you own an automobile, 
and drive it? 
A. I do. 
Q. You are a musician? 
A. Yes. 
Q. For whom do you work? 
A. I work for myself. 
28 Q. Are you an officer or employee or stock-
holder of the Northwest Casualty Company of 
Seattle, Washington? 
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A. No sir. 
Q. Or any other casualty company? 
A. No sir. 
Q. EYer been involved in any kind of a 
case where suit was brought against you, or you 
brought suit against somebody else? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Are you an officer, stockholder or em-
ployee of the Northwest Casualty Company of 
Seattle. 'V ashington? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Or any other casualty company? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Mrs. Westwood, you say you work as a 
bookkeeper for John Holley? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What business is that company engaged 
in? 
A. Wholesaling of poultry, butter, eggs and 
cheese. 
Q. Are you married. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What does your husband do? 
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A. He Is a mechanic down at the County 
Shops. 
Q. Are you an officer. stockholder or em-
ployee of the Northwest Casualty Company? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Or any other kind of casualty company 
which insures automobiles? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Mr. Ray. you say you are working for 
a printing company? 
A. I am a part owner. 
Q. That is with what company? 
A. The Acorn Printing Company. 
Q. Are you an officer, stockholder or an 
employee of the Northwest Casualty Company? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Or any other kind of a casualty com-
pany which insures automobiles? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Mrs. Williams, I understand you are a 
housewife? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What does your husband do? 
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A. I am a widow. 
Q. \\'hat did your husband do? 
A. He was running the elevator here in the 
County Building. 
Q. \Vas that Thomas \Villiams? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. A.re you an officer, employee, or a stock-
holder of any casualty company that carries in-
surance on automobiles. 
A. No sir. 
Q. Mr. Nalder, do I understand right now 
you are not employed? 
A. No. 
Q. What was your business when you were 
employed, what did you do? 
A. I was a groceryman. 
Q. Was that for yourself? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you a stockholder in any insurance 
-casualty insurance company, that carries in-
surance on automobiles? 
A. No. 
At the conclusion of the examination of the 
jury by plaintiff's counsel and before questioning 
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of the jurors by defendant's counsel, the ,jury 
was excused from ·the courtroom and the follow-
ing proceedings were had: 
MR. STEW ART: At this time, if Your 
Honor please, in view of the interrogation of the 
jury, the defendant, at this time, moves that this 
jury be discharged, and that a new jury be called 
to try this case, because of the prejudicial mis-
conduct of plaintiff's counsel in specifically ask-
ing each and every one of the jurors as to whether 
or not they were officers, agents, employees or 
stockholders of the Northwest Casualty Company, 
or any other insurance company, particularly by 
reason of asking such questions of John Self, who 
is a salesman, working for himself, and who does 
not drive an automobile, and particularly by ask-
ing the question of Virgil Groo, likewise a sales-
man, who indicated by his prior answer that 
he would be unlikely to have such a position; of 
asking such similar questions-identical questions 
of Charity Andrus, a housewife, whose husband 
works at the Producers Market, and who testified 
that she was a housewife, living at 138 East 7th 
South Street, and by asking the same question of 
Mr. McCowan, and asking the same question of 
34 Charles J. Lallis, and of asking the same ques-
tion of Merines M. Otten, 963 West 2nd South 
Street, formerly a shoe repairer, and not now 
working at any occupation, and, therefore, could 
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not be employed by such a concern: of asking the 
same question of Laura Willinms. widow of 
Thomas "~illiams. who. for years. was an eleva-
tor operator in this building. and herself is a 
housewife and unemployed: of asking the same 
question of Richard ,V. Ray, co-owner of the 
Acorn Printing Company: asking the same ques-
tion of Mrs. Edith Westwood, a housewife, who 
had previously stated that she worked for John 
Holley, and that her husband was employed in 
the Salt Lake County Shops, and who could, 
therefore, have no connection with an insurance 
company; of asking the same question of Dan H. 
Nalder, who had previously testified that he was 
unemployed, and, therefore, could not have been 
an employee of such a concern. Of asking the 
same question of Evan Timothy, of 812 East 5th 
South, who had previously testified that he was 
a music teacher-I think he said the violin and 
accordion-and he could not, therefore, have been 
such an employee of such company; and of ask-
ing the same question of John T. Booth. 
And it clearly and definitely appearing, from 
the nature of the examination, and the method 
followed in pursuing it, as well as from the state-
ments made by counsel in the court's presence, 
before the jury was sworn and examined, that 
these questions, in view of the nature of the jurors, 
35 their businesses and connections-three of them, 
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at least, being housewives, would make it im-
possible to conceive that such questions were ask-
ed in good faith for the purpose of determining 
either that the jury would be subject to challenge 
for cause or on peremptory challenges, and in 
view of the examination, and in view of the record 
that I previously made to Your Honor, it is my 
opinion that the defendant, Kenneth Butte, could 
not have a fair and impartial trial before this 
jury; that the questions were asked in such a 
manner as to directly suggest the existence of in-
surance in this case, when, as a matter of fact, 
there is no insurance protection, and we feel that 
it is imperative that this jury be discharged. 
THE COURT: The motion last made is 
denied. 
Thereupon the jurors were recalled to the 
courtroom and eight jurors sworn to try the case. 
G. M. HOPKINS, a witness called on behalf 
of the plaintiff, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
My name is G. M. Hopkins and I am a 
traffic investigator for the Salt Lake Police De-
partment and was such an officer on the 27th 
day of January, 1938. I was called to Third Ave-
nue and K Street on that day at about 1:30 P.M. 
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37 to investigate an an·ident. I drovt• direetly to 
Third Avenue and K. Street, arriving· within about 
four minutes after the call. I seen two ears that 
apparently had been in an uceidcnt and pro-
ceeded to make my usual inYe~tigation. examin-
ing both cars with reference to their positions on 
the street. also the surrounding conditions. I took 
measurements and made a rough sketch of what 
38 I saw. \\'ith reference to my sketch I can place 
on the blackboard the measurements and mark-
ings that I saw. 
40 Figure number 1 represents a truck, the gro-
cery delivery truck, which was lying on its left 
side on the northeast corner of the intersection. 
It was facing east on the left side in the center 
of the intersection, that is, in the center of K 
Street and right on the crosswalk was a Ford 
Coupe. I will mark that 2. We also found on the 
east part of the intersection one long tire mark 
which had been burned by a tire skidding, with a 
length of 36 feet, and at the termination of that 
mark was debris and glass on the street. Starting 
from the west side of the spot where the debris 
was, were two tire burns leading right over to 
the truck which was lying on its side. The width 
of these tire burns was 3?' feet. From a point 
which started to the point which stopped at the 
truck further up on the corner of the intersection 
is a tree about 16 or 18 inches in diameter, which 
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sets 15 feet north of the crosswalk. There was 
grass in the parking between the sidewalk-these 
lines represent the sidewalk-there was grass in 
here. And across that grass there up to that tree 
was two tire marks, tearing the grass out, show-
ing the car went up there. Then there was tire 
marks leading right back to the Ford coupe. We 
found the truck damaged on the front end more on 
the left front side, and the Ford coupe was dam-
aged on the right side slightly to the rear of the 
center. The visibility was good, it was a clear 
day. The width of Third Avenue was 45 feet and 
K Street is 40 feet wide at the south and 45 feet 
wide at the north. The truck mark commenced 
43 23 feet east of the east curb line. 
Q. Now, officer, did you go down on K 
Street and look over towards Third A venue? 
MR. STEW ART: I make the further ob-
jection there is no proper foundation laid. No 
showing that the condition and visibility was the 
same, or there were no obstructions at the time 
the accident occurred which were not present when 
the witness made the observation, which would 
affect the distance or the position or the visibility 
that he might undertake to testify to. 
44 Q. Well, officer, did you make the observa-
tion that I asked you, about how far you could see 
over on Third A venue from K Street? 
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MR. STEWART: just answer that yes or 
no. 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right now. assuming that there were 
no obstructions at the scene of the accident, about 
how far could you see from K Street over on 
Third A venue. 
~lR. STE\VA.Rl: We object to that as con-
taining an improper assumption. This witness 
cannot assume there were no cars there. 
THE COlJRT: The objection is overruled . 
. MR. STE\V.A..H.f: 1 make the further objec-
tion It IS mcompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, 
there is no proper foundation laid. Calling upon a 
witness to give evidence based upon an assump-
tio~ which neither he nor counsel has any right 
to include in such a question. 
THE COURT: The obJection is overruled. 
MR. STEWART: I make the further objec-
tion that the question, if answered, would have no 
probative value, there being no position fixed, and 
no basis to make it of any materiality. 
THE COURT: The obJection is overruled. 
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A. From a point 8 feet south of the south 
curb line of Third A venue. 
Q. Will you put a point to designate that? 
MR. STEW ART: Now, may my objection 
go to all this line of examination, or to all of the 
questions, that it is incompetent, irr~levant, im-
material, and no foundation laid, and these an-
swers are all based upon an assumption not apJ 
pearing in the record? 
tion. 
THE COURT: You may have your objec-
Q. To each question and each answer? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. Go ahead, Mr. Hopkins. 
MR. STEWART: Now I object to the wit-
ness making any marks upon the map showing 
any imaginary position or positions taken by 
him in making any observation or placing any 
distances or markings upon the map, relating to 
such positions, and I base my objection upon the 
same ground that I have heretofore indicated with 
respect to this line of examination. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
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A. From a point 80 feet south of the im-
aginary curb line of Third A venue to the centet· 
of K Street, a point being 80 feet down. taking 
80 feet east of the east curb line of the center of 
Third A venue-
MR. STE"\\TART: Now may the record show 
that over my objection the witness is proceeding 
to draw an imaginary line from a point in the 
center of K Street south of Third A venue to a 
point in the center of L Street east of K Street? 
THE COURT: It may so show. 
MR. STEWART: And that the line is being 
dra"'-n over my objection. 
THE COURT: I think it shows that, Mr. 
Stewart. 
A. From a point 80 feet south of the Third 
A venue curb line to the south side of Third Ave-
nue, you could see to a point 80 feet east of the 
east curb line of K Street. I stood at that point 
47 to see how far east I could see on Third Ave-
nue and I could see from there to there. The skid 
mark on Third A venue curved slightly to the 
north near the end of it. 
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CROSS-EXAl\HNATIOJ\' 
The sketch, Exhibit "C," is not a sketch that 
I made at the scene of the accident. I made it 
down at the police station. The marks on the black-
hoard are copied substantially from Exhibit "C." 
Independently of my record I don't purport to 
remember what I see in each particular accident. 
The only thing that I can do is refer to my record. 
These skid marks identified by A, B were tire 
burns by a tire skidding sideways. The tire marks 
to the wheels of the truck are the way that the 
marks led as I saw them and put them on my re-
port. I don't know how they were made at the 
51 time, by the front or the rear wheels. There was 
quite a little hit of debris and I made my measure-
ments as nearly as I could from the center of it. 
It was about 45 feet from the debris to the tree 
identified with the letter T. An automobile travel-
ing at a speed of 25 miles an hour travels about 36 
feet per second and at 20 miles an hour travels 
about 29 feet a second. The 36 foot line XY curved 
53 slightly to the north near the west end. I would 
say that the west end extended three or four feet 
farther north than the east end. I would say be-
54 tween two and three feet. Third Avenue is slight-
ly down hill and a car going westerly would be 
going down a slight grade. A car going up K 
Street would he going up grade. There were no 
tire marks or skid marks on K Street south of point 
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X where the debris was. There were no marks 
showing any gripping of tires on K Street. When 
I arrived at the scene of the aceident the Ford 
coupe was at point 2. Mr. Franz was there and 
I asked him if that was where the car stopped 
after the accident and he said yes. He told me 
that his car stopped at the point marked point 2 
and that is where his car came to a stop. And I 
55 saw marks from point X to point C and tire 
marks from point C, which is a 16 inch tree, back 
to the center of K Street. There were tire marks 
from point X from the curb and there were these 
heavy marks where the grass was dug up and 
there were tire marks that led back from the curb 
to the car at point 2 and I could see marks from 
point X to point C. 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Franz how his car got 
from point X to point C and hack to point 2 7 
MR. BERNSTEIN: We object to this as im-
materiaL 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. STEW ART: Exception. 
56 A car will stop more quickly going up hill 
than going down. K Street is asphalt, black top 
pavement and gives a 60 to 70 per cent coefficient 
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52 
breaking surface. Photograph, defendant's Ex-
hibit 2, resembles the intersection. It appears to 
be the same street. It appears to be the same as 
it was prior to the accident. There is no debris 
shown in the picture. Defendant's Exhibit 3 fair-
ly represents the intersection looking south on 
K Street from a point north of Third A venue. On 
Exhibit 3 there appear to be several marks shaped 
similar to the marks on the road but I wouldn't 
say they are tire marks because I don't know. 
59 I see marks on Exhibit 3 in the general locality of 
where I saw the marks on the road. I should judge 
it is a photograph of it. I see a line on the left 
side of Exhibit 3 commencing at a point east of 
the curb line and proceeding to the center of K 
Street. It would seem to be in approximately the 
same position as the 36 feet line between point X 
andY on the map. Exhibit 2 is a fair representation 
of the appearance of K Street looking north from 
Third A venue. I went down K Street 80 feet 
62 
south of the south curb line of Third Avenue and 
at no place between there and point X was there 
any indication of application of brakes or the 
pressure of tires gripping upon the highway. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
What I mean by that was that as a result 
of the collision the truck was damaged on the 
left front, showing that the collision happened on 
the left front of the truck. It was more on the left 
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front of the car at the eorner. It uppeart'd that the 
force of the impact came toward the left front 
corner. 
ERNEST H. CHRISTENSEN, called on be-
half of the plaintiff. testified as follows: 
My name is Ernest H. Christensen and I am 
a police officer and I am the police officer who 
assisted Mr. Hopkins at the intersection of Third 
Avenue and K. Street January 27, 1938. I took 
64 some photographs at the scene of the accident. I 
66 held the tape and officer Hopkins put down the 
69 
measurements. 
GERALD A. FRANZ, called on behalf of the 
plaintiff, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
My name is Gerald A. Franz and I live at 
50 North Fifth West, Salt Lake City. I am a 
stage driver for the Union Pacific Stages, and 
was very well acquainted with S. G. Saltas, hav-
ing known him several years. He was with me 
70 on January 27th in a Ford VB. I was driving the 
car and he was sitting on my right. As we ap-
proached Third Avenue on K Street I shifted into 
second gear and drove in the center. As I entered 
the intersection I looked in both directions and 
did not notice anything coming. Drove towards 
the center of the street approximately two feet 
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from the center line and the truck hit me on the 
right side towards the rear of the car. We were 
both thrown out. I was driving possibly between 
15 and 20 miles an hour. When I approached the 
intersection I looked both ways, both east and 
west. When we got about just over the imaginary 
line of the intersection this truck hit me on the 
72 right side. I shifted into second gear to prevent 
lugging the motor. It would run better in second 
gear than third and I was going up hill. I no-
73 ticed the truck about the moment it hit me, just 
about - it was possibly within 20 feet of me, 
75 or 15,- before it hit me. I was approximately 60 
or 80 feet south of the south line of the intersec-
tion when I put my car in second gear. As I en-
tered the intersection I made an observation in 
both directions, east and west, and couldn't see 
76 anything coming. I was about 15 or 20 feet south 
of the north side of Third A venue when the truck 
hit me. Mark X represents my automobile. It is 
77 marked 2. Mark 1 represents the truck. 
After the noon recess Mr. Franz further 
testified as follows: 
As I neared the intersection just over the 
the imaginary line I first saw the car, which was 
probably 100 or 110 feet up the road east of the 
intersection, east of the south imaginary line of 
the intersection. I continued on across the inter-
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55 
section and at a point near the eenter of the in-
tersection I saw this truck over here about 20 
or 25 feet. It was then I thought I would be hit 
and I started in this direction towards the left. 
MR. METOS: Now, Mr. Franz, how far 
north ·were you of the south line-imaginary line 
-when you first observed the truck, when you 
were going up north? 
~1R. STE,VART: I object to that as repetit-
tious. The witness just a moment ago pointed to 
the south imaginary line on the south side of 
Third Avenue. 
MR. MET OS: What I want to do is to just 
indicate with a dot approximately where he was. 
MR. METOS: Now can you state how 
many feet you were south or north of this line-
imaginary line, when you saw that truck? 
MR. STEWART: I object to that; it ap-
pearing that he put the mark of his automobile 
right on the imaginary line. Counsel is trying 
to get him to put it one way or the other. He put 
it directly on the south curb line of Third Avenue. 
MR. MET OS: So far as I am concerned, 
Your Honor, if he wants to leave that car at that 
point there is no objection to that. 
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MR. STEW ART: I want to leave it to the 
witness. 
THE COURT: I think he may state the 
number of feet, if he wants to. 
[ had met Mr. Saltas in the Union Pacific 
Garage. We drove around on the east side of 
town, went down to Thirteenth South and hack on 
Ninth East. 
82 Q. You haven't any claim against the de-
fendant in this case, of any kind? 
A. No sir, that was taken care of-
MR. STEWART: Just a moment. I take an 
exception to counsel asking the question of the 
witness, and answering before I can make an ob-
jection, and assign it as misconduct on the part 
of counsel and ask the court to discharge the 
jury. The witness started to answer and then an-
swered the question before I had a chance to ob-
ject. 
MR. METOS: He didn't answer it, I think. 
MR. STEW ART: He answered enough of it. 
MR. MET OS: I don't want any error in this 
record. It may go out. 
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MR. STEW ART: After you brought it out, 
it is then too late. 
THE COURT: Read the question. 
MR. STEWART: just a moment. I don't 
want the answer read right in the presence of the 
jury. 
THE COURT: Mr. Reporter, will you 
please read the answer and the question. 
(Question and answer read to the court) 
MR. STEWART: I take an exception to the 
question and answer being read. 
THE COURT: The motion is denied. 
MR. BERNSTEIN: May the record show 
the question and answer was read to the court 
and not within the hearing of the jury? 
MR. STEW ART: The question and answer 
was read so that I could hear the question read 
by the reporter. 
THE COURT: The record may show the 
reporter read it so the court could only hear it. 
The court isn't advised as to whether the jury 
heard it. 
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MR. STEWART: I take an exception to the 
ruling of the court. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION: 
During the recess Mr. Metos talked with me 
for a few minutes. Mr. Metos took the transcript 
of the testimony in the former case and called my 
attention to the fact that on the previous trial 
I had testified that I saw the truck when it was 
100 to 110 feet east. He called my attention to 
that distance and when I got on the stand this 
86 afternoon I corrected my testimony. The automo-
bile which [ was driving was in good condition 
and had good brakes. It was a Ford V8 and had 
good power, as good as the average Ford. There 
was no particular reason for our going for the 
ride. We drove around town possibly an hour. 
87 As I remember we came up Ninth East to South 
Temple and then turned up K Street. In driving 
up K Street I don't believe we had any point picked 
88 out. We were just driving. We just turned up K 
Street on a pleasure drive. I have had a lot of ex-
perience driving heavy equipment. The grade 
89 on K Street was about four per cent. A four per 
cent grade isn't very steep. I don't know whether 
any modern car will gain speed on a six to eight 
per cent grade. The rear end of my car was ap-
proximately on the extended line of the south 
curb of Third A venue when I first saw the truck 
':J1 coming. When the rear end of my car was about 
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at the south curb of Third Avenue this truck was 
approximately 100 to 110 feet east of the east 
curn line of K Street. That is my judgment. l 
don't know whether Third Avenue is about 45 
92 feet wide. As near as I can guess my car traveled 
a distance of between 20 and 25 feet, not to ex-
ceed 30 feet, while the other car went a distance 
of between 100 and 110. 
93 Q. Now, did you make the following an-
swer this morning: "We proceeded into the inter-
section, and when we got about just over the 
imaginary center line of the intersection this 
truck hit me at the rear of the door, on the right 
side of the coupe,.'? Q. Now, did you-1 want 
to read you this question and answer-tell me if 
this is what you testified to this morning: "Q. 
(By Mr. Metos) Now while you were crossing the 
intersection did you see the truck? A. I no-
ticed it about the moment it hit me, just about-
it was possibly within 20 feet of me or 15 feet 
before it hit me." Is that what you answered this 
morning? 
A. That was the answer I was confused 
on. That is when, at least, I thought I would h~ 
hit. Before, when I saw it, I didn't have any idea 
that I would he hit. I felt safe in going across the 
street. 
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Q. So that you first testified that when 
you first saw the truck it was within 15 or 20 
feet of you, and then later voluntarily changed 
thai to read 15 or 20 feet east of the east curb line 
of K Street, didn't you? 
A. That is right. That is what I was try-
ing to correct, and I couldn't get it straightened. 
You wouldn't give me a chance. 
Q. Now you want to correct it a third time, 
after Mr. Metos called your attention to the trans-
cript, and want to say it was about 100 or 120 feet 
when you first saw it. It that right? 
A. That is right. 
Q. You remember testifying at the other 
trial, don't you? 
A. Yes. 
95 Q. Do you remember being asked, in the 
other trial, where your car was when you first 
saw the truck, do you remember that? Do you 
remember that question being asked? 
A. No I don't. 
Q. Do you remember in the other trial testi-
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fying that the first time you saw the other truck 
was when you were about in the center of Third 
Avenue? 
A. 1 don't remember it. 
Q. Let me ask you if you recall these ques-
tions-page 42. Do you remember making this 
answer: ··~-\..s I got into the intersection I noticed 
a truck approaching from the east going west. It 
seemed I was far enough across the intersection. I 
was practically in the center of the intersection at 
the time I saw the truck." Do you remember 
making that statement? 
A. Something to that effect 
Q. Now do you remember this: "Q. And 
when you saw it approximately how far was it 
east? A. I should judge about 100 feet." Is that 
what you testified to in the other trial? 
A. Something like that, yes. 
Q. Did you testify at the other trial that 
you tried to beat it across the intersection? 
A. I think I used the word "beat," but 
that wasn't the right word. 
MR. STEW ART: I will go to the next one. 
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Q. Did you testify, at the other trial: "and I 
believed I could beat it across the intersection." 
Did you so testify at the other trial? 
A. I think so. 
Q. And you didn't ever put on your brakes, 
did you? 
A. No. 
Q. And you didn't even try to stop? 
A. No I didn't. 
Q. Going in a Ford coupe up the grade 
that you were going on K Street, at between 15 
and 20 miles an hour, you could have stopped it 
in 15 feet, couldn't you? 
A. I think so. 
Q. Now did you testify as follows at the 
other trial: 45. T n answer to this question "Will 
you point out on this map here where you were 
when you saw the other car on the east. A. I 
was about here. This portion here." You were 
pointing at the map. "It was about there, prac-
tically in the center." Did you so testify? 
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A. Possibly so, don't remember. 
99 Q. Now, did you make this further state-
ment at the other trial: .. After I got into the in-
tersection where I indicated there I saw this 
truck coming possibly 100 or 110 feet up on the 
east side of the intersection." Did you say that? 
A. I believe so. 
100 Q. And the place that you indicated there 
was the point that you fixed, substantially in the 
center of the intersection. That is true, isn't it? 
A. I believe so, hut then, if I could draw 
it in proportion to the street it would he a little 
larger than that. 
MR. METOS: I object to that, Your Honor, 
because the answer read from the transcript there 
doesn't show that he referred to another map, that 
is not in evidence. It only tends to confuse the 
witness here and the jury and the court. The 
witness has testified, two or three times, where 
he was when he first saw it. I think it is repeti-
tious in addition to being confusing. 
MR. STEWART: Let's see if it is confusing. 
Let's go to page 51 of the transcript, Mr. Metos. 
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MR. MET OS: All right. 
Q. Answer this question: "Q. And never, 
at any time prior to reaching a point approximate-
ly in the center of Third A venue, did you see the 
101 truck coming west. A. No I did not." Did you 
so answer that question at the other trial? 
A. I believe I did, hut, Mr. Stewart, I would 
only he 10 feet f'rom the center if I was on the 
imaginary line. 
Q. At the other trial here-at the other 
trial did you say that never at any time prior to 
reaching a point approximately in the center of 
the intersection did you see the other car, and 
why, today, did you say you saw it when you 
were at the south side of the intersection? This 
place? 
A. I think J said, in the other trial, when 
it was nearly at the center. This would he with-
in 10 feet of the center. 
Q. Do you remember coming into my office 
and talking to me? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you at that time, in my office, tell 
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me that you never saw the truck until the instant 
of the impact. 
A. I was m your office. but I didn't tell 
you that. 
102 Q. Did you testify at the other trial, and 
did you make answer to this question: "Q. How 
far did your car travel while the other car was 
going 100 feet? A. Probably 10 or 12 feet." Did 
you make that answer at the other trial? 
A. I answered a question like that. 
103 The view east on Third A venue wasn't ob-
structed by the store. There was nothing north of 
the store to obstruct my view. The accident oc-
curred in January and there were no leaves on 
the trees. When I reached the point on K Street 
just above the figure 40 I looked east. At that 
time I couldn't see a block and a half east. 
104 Q. All right, you knew, as you approached 
Third A venue that it was your duty to yield the 
right of way to a driver approaching from the 
right if the car was approaching as close to the 
intersection as you were? 
MR. METOS: I object to that on the ground 
that that is calling for a legal conclusion. 
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IH.E COLJK1: !he objection is sustained. 
107 As far as I know my car stopped where the 
map is marked with the figure 2 and I told that 
to officer Christensen. I never did see the other 
108 car until J was within 10 feet of the center of the 
intersection. The front end of my car was at 
109 least 15 feet into the intersection. That was the 
first time T saw the westbound truck. 
t 10 W. KALE, a "vitness on behalf of the plain-
tiff, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
I live at 752 First A venue and am a guard at 
the Veterans' Administration. On January 27, 1938, 
t 11 I lived at 829 Fifth Avenue. The Affleck truck 
passed me at L Street and Third Avenue going 
in the same direction. I was traveling about 15 
112 miles an hour. It is my judgment the truck was 
going between 45 and 50 miles an hour. I could 
113 not say how far I was between L and K Street 
114 when the crash occurred. I don't know how far I 
was from the east curb of K Street when I heard 
the crash. My best idea would be that I was one-
115 third of the way from K Street. I stopped right 
along-there was a truck along the north side 
and I was back of it. 
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I had a broken spring on my cur and was 
driving slowly to take my car to have it fixed. 
117 My little three year old girl was with me. I had 
been driving very carefully. I couldn't have been 
much past L Street when the truck passed me. J 
heard the crash and then glanced up and saw 
it. I didn't exactly see the collision but saw it 
after it happened. I was just riding down the 
street and wasn't following the truck with my 
eyes as it went past. It just passed like any other 
118 car would pass. I didn't follow it as it proceeded 
all the way to K Street. When I heard the crash 
I didn't look at the side of the road to see just 
how far I was down the block. I didn't undertake 
119 to measure the distance that my car traveled 
or exactly where it was when I heard the crash. 
121 ALTON BUNNELL, a witness on behalf of 
the plaintiff, testified as follows. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
My name is Alton Bunnell and I live at 135 
Major Street. On January 27, 1938, I lived at 
740 Third Avenue. I am 17 years of age and have 
driven an automobile. On January 27th around 
122 1 o'clock I saw the Affleck truck going west on 
Third A venue. I was sitting in the front room on 
the sofa looking out the window. Our house was 
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located on the southwest corner of Third A venue 
and L Street. 
Q. Have you a judgment as to the speed 
of the truck? 
MR. STEW ART: I object to the question as 
being no proper foundation laid, the witness not 
being qualified as to speed, to express an opinion. 
THE COURT: He may answer the question. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in your judgment how fast was the 
truck going west at the time you saw it? 
MR. STEWART: We object to that as he~ 
ing incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, no 
proper foundation having been laid. The testi-
mony as to the speed at the place where this wit-
ness saw it would not have any relevancy in con-
nection with an accident occurring one block 
west, and, if the court has any doubt, I would 
like to argue the law. The theory of my objection 
is that there was no presumption that a car will 
continue at the same rate of speed and will not 
slow down at a subsequent crossing, and, further-
more, that the witness has not testified that he 
124 watched it after it left L Street, and as it pro-
ceeded toward K, and under these circumstances 
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he would be unable to express an opinion as to 
the speed which the car might have been going 
when it reached K Street. 
THE COURT: The objection IS overruled. 
A. I would say it was going at least 45 
miles an hour. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
I had turned 16 in October before the ac-
12? cident. From the north side of the store to the 
curb would be nearly 16 feet. I was sitting on the 
sofa looking out the window. As I glanced out 
the window I saw the truck coming. I observed 
the D. A. Affleck sign. At the other trial I testi-
129 fied it was going at least 40 miles an hour. I was 
sitting on the south side of the sofa kinda facing 
northeast on the end of the sofa away from the 
window, about five feet from the window. I 
didn't see it after it passed beyond the point where 
my eyes were looking through the window. 
130 MR. METOS: Are you willing to stipulate 
that the deceased, S. G. Saltas, was thirty year~ 
of age at the time of the accident? 
MR. STEWART: I don't know what his 
age was. 
MR. METOS: And had a life expectancy of 
thirty-five years and three months? 
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MR. STEW ART: I don't know what his 
age was. 
MR. METOS: That is what we allege in our 
complaint and that is what we will prove. 
MR. ST'EW ART: 1 will he willing to stip-
ulate. 
MR. METOS: Assuming he was thirty years 
of age. That is what he was. 
MR. STEWART: The only limitation of 
such stipulation would he this: That, in this par-
ticular case, where a father is suing for the death 
of an adult child, and where the father's age is 
such as it is in this case, that the American Mor-
tality Table would not he applicable and the 
cause of action would he solely for the benefit of 
the father on the basis of any contemplated dam-
ages. If he personally would receive it it would 
make the mortality table ineffective. 
MR. MET OS: Are you willing to stipulate 
that the mortality table is evidence, and let the 
court rule on it? 
MR. STEWART: I will stipulate that the 
mortality table is as you stated, thirty-five years 
and three months. It is absolutely incompetent, 
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irrelevant and immaterial. and we particularly 
object to it being received in evidence in this case. 
131 MR. METOS: The plaintiff's age is 60 years. 
THE COURT: Well, it apparently has some 
probative value in connection with all the evi-
dence in the case, the objection will be over-
ruled. 
132 THE COURT: The objection to the ad-
mission of the American Experience Table of Mor-
tality showing the expectancy of life of the de-
ceased to be thirty-five years and three months, 
is overruled. 
GEORGE SALT AS, plaintiff, testified as fol-
lows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
My name is George Saltas and I live in Bing-
133 ham. I have lived there thirteen years. Spero 
Saltas was my son and was 30 years old. I am 
a widower. Spero Saltas was not married. My 
wife is dead. I have five children living with me. 
I had eight children hut have got seven now. My 
134 son was working at the time of his death. He was 
working at the Utah Copper for $5.85 a day. He 
worked every day. He had been working for 
135 twelve years. He lived with me all the time, all 
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his life. He Jived at the same house with me in 
Copperfield. He helped me out all the time. He 
helped me raise my family. Anything I ever 
asked him he give me. I am not in good health. 
r have been in Bingham since 1907 and after I 
go to Idaho for seven years about. Every winter 
came in Bingham and worked again, worked in 
Bingham. In Idaho I farmed. Spero worked on 
the farm. He went to school to the eighth grade 
137 and then started working. Spero turned over 
138 money to me. He gave me about $100 a month. He 
paid the rent. He paid the rent because Utah 
139 Copper charge it to the check. Spero paid the 
rent from 1927 when he started to get his check 
along about '27, eight years. Utah Copper work 
this way, it was for the days work. I work three 
days over for Spero and Utah Copper take three 
days rent. They take it from my check, take three 
days rent for time Spero started to pay the rent. 
Utah Copper started to take rent off my son's 
140 check in 1934. My son had an automobile. Dur-
141 ing the depression Spero worked ten to thirteen 
days a month. From '31-'30 to '33 he worked 
ten to thirteen days: $3.80 a day. 
144 CROSS-EXAMINATION: 
I have been working in Bingham approxi~ 
145 mately thirty years. I am working for the Utah 
Copper. Except when I operated the farm in 
Idaho I worked either for the Utah Copper or the 
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U. S. Mines. I eurn $4.23 a duy. 1 um working 
twenty-two days a month. I have been earning 
$4.25 a day for a substantial time. Two years 
ago I worked thirty days a month. In 1937 Spero 
took a vacation to California. He went to Yellow-
stone Park. I haYe a boy Paul and a boy Pete. 
Paul has been working about three years and 
makes $5.00 a day. Pete has been working pretty 
close to two years and a half. 
Q. And how much does Pete earn? 
MR. METOS: Just a minute. I ~bject to 
that on the ground it is immaterial, irrelevant and 
incompetent and not within the issues of this 
case. It doesn't go to any issue. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. STEW ART: Exception. 
148 Paul was living at home and still lives at 
home and is still working. Pete was living at home 
a year ago. He left home now about a month 
ago he go out of the home. He was living at 
home before and for some time after Spero's 
death. 
Q. Now, between you and Paul and Pete, 
at the time of Spero's death, you were earning 
about $13.00 a day, were you not? 
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MR. METOS: object to that as imma-
terial and irrelevent and incompetent and entirely 
prejudicial. I never asked this witness if they made 
any money or contributed anything to him. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
149 About a year ago Paul pay his hoard and 
sometimes he give a dollar or two at home and 
when Pete was working he paid hoard. Spero did 
not pay hoard. When I work at present time the 
rent deducted out of his check, and if I work three 
days over for Spero, Utah Copper Company-
Utah Copper wants to collect other days, more 
rent, because I pay some for the days I work, 
so it makes it twenty days a month, and they pay 
151 twenty days rent. I paid part of the rent. I have 
a married daughter. My children are pretty well 
grown up. Pete hoards some place in boarding 
house down in Bingham. The car was for the 
whole family. It belonged to the whole family. 
153 Paul and Pete lend the money to Spero. Pete 
works for the Utah Copper. I am past 62 last 
154 November. I now pay rent for the number of 
days I work. I pay 90c a day. If I work twenty-
five days then I pay full rent. If I work twenty-
two days I pay $19.80. 
1 ?6Y2 Q. Mr. Saltas, for some months prior to 
Spero's death, didn't he live at what is known as 
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Cyprus Hall? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. How long did he live at Cyprus Hall? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Well, about how long? 
A. Two O:f three months. I don7t remem-
her. 
Q. Well, it that your best recollection, two 
or three months? 
A. I can't understand that. 
Q. Is that your best recollection, two or 
three months. Didn't he live there longer than 
that? 
177 A. I can't understand at all what you mean. 
Q. Now, didn't your son Paul pay the rent 
to the Utah Copper Company for several months? 
A. May I explain it better? 
Q. You can answer my question. Didn't 
your son pay the rent for several months? 
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MR. STEWART: During the year 1937? 
A. Yes; I asked if I could explain how he 
did. 
Q. Didn't they deduct from his wages sev-
eral months? 
A. Paul pay the rent right now. I been 
sick. Since 1935 Utah Copper wants to collect the 
rent, and so I now work, and turn the rent to 
Paul and Paul figure up the rent. 
Q. Now, just a minute. I am not talking 
about 1935 at all. When you were sick-you were 
working in 193?, weren't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't Spero live at Cyprus Hall? 
A. Not in '37. 
Q. Not in '3?? 
A. No. 
178 Didn't Paul pay part of the rent in 1937? 
A. Not pay rent at all. He just charge the 
Utah Copper with his check. He charge it with 
his board. Not pay any. 
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Q. But the rent was deducted from Paurs 
check? 
A. But I paid,-charge to him-
Q. Will you please answer my question? 
A. But he pay rent-not pay rent. I pay 
rent. He pay his hoard, and pay-because rent is 
$30.00, and he pay some days for the hoard, not 
pay the rent. 
Q. Or at least part of it deducted from 
Paul's pay check. Now, answer that question .. · 
A. Charge to his check. 
Q. No~, just a minute. It was charged to 
his check, wasn't it? 
A. Yes sir. 
179 Q. And while Spero was living at Cyprus 
Hall wasn't the coal hill deducted from Spero's 
check, and the rent deducted from Paul's? 
A. They, they not-
Q. Now, during 1937, before January of 
1938, wasn't the rent deducted from Paul's check? 
A. Yes. 
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Spero's? 
A. At that time coal was charged to Spero. 
Q. Do you know Mr. Watson? 
180 A. Mr. who? 
Q. Mr. A. W. Watson at Bingham? 
A. Yes, he is at the Utah Copper. 
246 Q. Now, I asked you the other day about 
247 Spero living at Cyprus Hall? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Was he living at home in 1935 and 1936? 
A. I don't remember exactly. It was '35 or 
'36 he lived at Cyprus. 
Q. You remember you said something about 
his living at Cyprus Hall for two or three months? 
A. About that time, yes. 
Q. Now, isn't it a fact that he lived in 
Cyprus Hall from the 1st day of April, 1935, to 
the 10th day of March, 1936, a period of thirteen 
months and ten days? 
A. No, that is not true. 
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A. 1 am sure. because l don't remember so 
long. Besides. too. he wants to go. 
Q. I am asking you for a date. 
A. I don't remember exactly how long. 
Q. Now, you are sure he didn't live there 
thirteen months? 
A. I am not sure. 
Q. What is that? 
A. I am not sure how long he lived, I don't 
remember. 
Q. Did Spero pay any rent to December 1, 
1934? 
A. To December when? 
Q. To December 1, 1934? 
A. No. 
Q. What is that? 
248 A. No sir. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that you paid all the 
rent from December 1, 1934, to December 31, 1935? 
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A. Yes sir. 
Q. And isn't it a fact that Paul paid all 
the rent from December 1, 1935, to the present 
time? 
A. I want to explain this. 
Q. Just answer this question. Isn't it a fact? 
A. I no answer this question because I got 
to explain. I refuse to answer. 
THE COURT: Yes, you are required, Mr. 
Saltas, to answer the question. 
A. It was this different way with him so 
that he charge it to his check. 
A. Why won't you let me explain? 
THE COURT: The explanation will be 
called for by your own attorney afterwards, if 
he desires to do so. 
249 A. Charge to his check. 
Q. It was charged to Paul's check? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And charged to his check. including 
January 1, 1936? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. So that during all of 1936 and 193?', the 
rent was taken out of Paul's check? 
A. Yes sir: but charged to him. 
Q. Let me make this clear, isn't it a fact 
that there has been no rent deducted by the Utah 
Copper Company from Spero's check? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Since November, 1934? 
A. Yes, that is to him. 
Q. Let me see if you understand the ques-
tion. Prior to December, that is, before December? 
A. Before December, 1934, charged to Spero. 
Q. Yes; now since that time none of it has 
been charged to Spero? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you mean that? 
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A. Charged to 1) au1, charged to me, with 
my name, December, 1934, charged to Spero in 
1935, I been sick. 
250 Q. ln 1934, to November, it was charged 
to Spero, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Ano since December 1, 1934, no rent-
has been charged to Spero? 
A. No. 
Q. That 1s right, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And since December 1, 1934, Spero has 
worked for the Utah Copper Company? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And from December 1, 1934, to Decem-
ber 31, 1935, the rent was all charged to you? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And since December 31, 1935, it has all 
been charged to Paul? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. You are sure you huvc got that deur? 
Isn't it a fact that Spero didn't live at home, but 
lived and hoarded and roomed at Cyprus Hall? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. From April 1, 1935, to March 10, 1936? 
251 A. I don't remember exactly how long. 
Q. Was it about that long? 
A. He lived there-he lived there three or 
four months and five months. I don't think he 
lived there six months, that I remember. I don't 
remember more. I remember he live at Cyprus 
HalL hut how long I don't remember. 
Q. When you first testified in this case, 
didn't you tell us he lived at home and paid rent 
all the time? 
A. Since he live with Cyprus he pay-live 
in the home, because he just stay there. No, he 
work-he was at work, and at time he want to 
come home-stay home there three or four hours, 
sometimes sleep home. 
Q. When you testified 1n answer to Mr. 
Metos' question before I questioned you, did you 
say anything at all about his living at Cyprus 
Hall? 
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A. Say anything, you say? 
Q. When Mr. Metos questioned you did you 
tell him that your son lived at Cyprus Hall for 
several months? 
A. I don't remember of saying that. 
252 Q. Did you testify before, in the trial, that 
Paul paid the rent from January 1st on? 
A. Yes, I say he paid it sometimes. 
Q. Can you read? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Now, your testimony begins right here. 
Your testimony begins right there, and goes over to 
the next page, and several pages. Will you find 
any place in there where you testified that your 
son lived in Cyprus Hall? Can you find any place 
there where you testified that Paul paid any of 
the rent? 
MR. METOS: Now, just a minute, I object 
to that, Your Honor, as not proper cross-examina-
tion. He was not asked those questions either on 
direct or cross-examination before. If I remem-
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her the rceord eorreetly. there wasn't a question 
asked this witness about these matters. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
BY MR. STEWART: 
Q. I will ask you again. In the former trial 
you said that Spero was the only boy that helped 
you? 
A. Yes. 
MR. METOS: What page is that? 
MR. STEWART: Page 92. 
Q. The only hoy to help you. That is what 
you testified to before? 
A. Yes sir. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION: 
254 The rent in 1934 charged Spero's check. Spero 
still worked ten days a month and I work fifteen 
days a month. The rules of the Utah Copper-he-
cause I live in Utah Copper house-charge the 
rent by the day, and so Spero work for ten days 
and I work for fifteen days. I have run three to 
five days rent and they transfer from Spero to 
my check in 1935. In December I get sick, and stay 
two months, and I not go to work. The rent went 
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to Paurs check. Since today charge every month 
to Paul's check, and Paul charge to me. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION: 
255 The rent was changed from Spero to me in 
1934. 
256 Q. All right, now; that was on the tst day 
of December, wasn't it? 
A. I don't remember the date. 
155 MARY SALT AS, a witness for the plaintiff, 
testified as follows: 
My name is Mary Saltas and I live at Copper-
field, Bingham. I am related to George Saltas. 
MR. STEWART: Now, just a moment. If 
the court please, at this time we assign the call-
ing of this witness in this particular action, assign 
it as misconduct, and object to the witness testi-
fying, it appearing that this is an action for the 
benefit of the father only, and the effect of pro-
ducing in the courtroom and putting upon the 
witness stand the present witness, is prejudicial 
to the rights of the defendant, and we ask the 
court to instruct the jury to disregard anything 
that this witness may say, and eliminate from 
their minds the fact that she has been called as 
a witness in this action. I don't care to argue it. 
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THE COURT: The motion is denied. You 
may proceed. 
158 MR. STEW ART: 1 neglected to ask Mr. 
Franz one or two questions. I understand coun-
sel is willing to stipulate he would testify, if he 
were recalled, that is, in substance, that Spero 
Saltas, while riding in the automobile with Mr. 
Franz, made no complaint about the manner of 
the driving of the automobile by Mr. Franz, and in 
approaching and entering the intersection made no 
complaint or comment of any nature. 
MR. METOS: We will admit that Mr. Franz 
would so testify if he were called. 
MR. METOS: We rest, Your Honor. 
159 T. W. SOUTHWORTH, a witness for the de-
fendant, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
My name is T. W. Southworth and I am a 
traffic officer of Salt Lake City, being in that 
service about two and one-half years as a traffic 
investigator. During that time I have conducted 
and participated in the conducting of tests relating 
to speed of automobiles and distances within which 
they may be stopped at different speeds and have 
records of the results of those tests and have 
learned concerning distances within which vari-
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ous makes of cars with various types of brakes 
may be stopped at different speeds. I have served 
as a witness in testifying as to such speeds and 
stopping distances. Last evening I went to the 
intersection of K Street and Third A venue, and 
made a test of a car driven north on K Street 
immediately south of Third Avenue. I also made 
a measurement of the distance between the south 
curb of Third A venue and the north wall of the 
162 Gem Grocery. It was 18 feet from the south curb 
line of Third A venue to the north side of the Gem 
Grocery. I drove an automobile north on K Street 
to the right of the center line of the road to a 
point where I was able to see the intersection of 
163 Third Avenue and L Street. The right side of my 
car was 11 feet west of the curb and I measured 
the distance from the left front hub cap of my 
automobile to the south curb line of Third Ave-
nue and that distance was 17 feet. I have placed 
upon the blackboard the position of my car, 
with the left front hub cap 17 feet south of the 
south curb line of Third Avenue and the right 
side of my car 11 feet west of the east curb 
of K Street. 
164 Q. Mr. Southworth, as a result of your 
testing of automobiles, various types of automo-
biles using four wheel brakes, what have you 
discovered, if anything, as to whether or not 
different makes of cars, assuming that the brakes 
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are in good condition, stop or do not stop in sub-
stantially the same distance? 
A. Yes, they stop in the same distance. 
Q. Regardless of make? 
A. Regardless of make. 
Q. And that has been a fact that you have 
established from tests that you have made? 
A. That is true. 
165 Q. And you were driving a Chrysler four-
wheel brake car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And from your experience and tests that 
yon have made, is there any difference between 
the distance that such a car will stop and the dis-
tance that other cars with four-wheel brakes will 
stop under the same circumstances and road con-
ditions? 
A. There is no difference. 
Q. Now, I will ask you again at what rate 
of speed you were driving your Chrysler car 
when you were on K Street? 
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MR. METOS: 1 make the same objection, 
as incompetent. 
· l'HE COURT: The objection 1s overruled. 
A. At 18 miles per hour. 
Q. Where, if any place, on K Street did you 
apply the brakes on your car? 
A. At about 33 feet south of the south curb 
line of Third A venue when the brakes first took 
hold on the road surface. 
166 Q. Now, will you tell us within what dis-
tance, after the brakes took effect, that your car 
came to a complete stop? 
A. 16 feet. 
Q. And can you tell us whether or not your 
car was still south of the south curb line of Third 
A venue when your car came to a stop? 
A. It was. 
Q. Now. when you made the observation to 
the east on Third Avenue from the point 17 feet 
south of the curb line-that is, where the left 
front wheel hub cap was 17 feet south, from your 
position in the driver's seat, were you then able to 
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see automobiles proceeding east and west on Third 
A venue crossing L Street? 
A. I was. 
167 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
I had heard some remarks after the accident 
that an accident had happened. I knew that an 
investigation had been made. I did not know 
168 that until after I went down last night. 
ANDREW T. JACOBSEN, a witness for the 
defendant, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
My name is Andrew T. Jacobsen and I am 
thirty-one years old. I, with my father, operate 
the Gem Grocery on Third Avenue and K Street. 
169 I was in the store on the 27th day of January, 
1938, when an accident occurred. I didn't see the 
accident but heard the crash and immediately 
went out the front door. The coupe, at least the 
front wheels, were up over the curb and almost 
to a large tree which stands in the parking on the 
170 northwest corner approximately where the C is 
on the blackboard. I saw the driver of the coupe. 
Evidently he had been thrown out of the car. He 
got into the car and backed it off the parking back 
into the middle of the road on K Street more or 
less where the impact perhaps took place. About 
171 in the center of the street, in the center of K 
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Street. After he stopped the car he got out again 
and was on the curb. I heard him make a state-
ment to one of the officers. I couldn't say which 
one. The statement was to the effect that the 
car was in the position then as when it was hit; 
that that is where it stopped after the impact. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
In referring to the statement that I heard 
I was talking about the man who drove the car 
that was in the accident. I don't know his name. 
The impact occurred approximately where you 
have it. .» 
180 RAY VAN NOYES, a witness on behalf of 
the defendant testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
My name is Ray Van Noyes and I live at 
?65 Third Avenue, Salt Lake City, and lived there 
in January of 1938. My home is between Land M 
Streets on the north side of Third A venue. I am 
an employee of Salt Lake City in the License De-
181 partment and am a special police officer. I recall 
an accident that occurred at Third Avenue and K 
Street January 2?, 1938, involving a D. A. Af-
fleck truck. I was on my lawn going down to 
my car to go to work after lunch. My car was 
parked on the north side of Third Avenue facing 
west. I casually noticed the truck and am in 
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the habit of observing ears. I watched it for 150 
feet, somewheres around there. l didn't see the 
accident. I heard it and looked up. I have had 
experience in driving cars and in observing 
the speed of cars. l have made arrests for speed-
ing and given tickets to trucks and automobiles. 
183 In my opinion the speed of the truck was 20 or 
184 
25 or 30 miles an hour, around there. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION: 
I was going down to my car and was talk-
ing to my wife. It was just a matter of observing 
cars, the license plates on the back, to see if they 
have city license plates or not. I observed it as I 
would any other car, any truck goes by I look 
185 to see all of them. I check on all the merchants' 
and everybody elses trucks as they go by. In my 
judgment it was going between 25 and 30 miles, 
around there. It would be anywhere between 20 
186 and 30. I figured it was a rate of speed that was 
within the law. After the car passed me before 
the crash occurred it was about a period of time 
running about one of those small blocks, about 
400 feet I should judge, one of those small blocks., 
At the other trial I was asked to come, I think 
it was by Gerald Irvine. I think he was the at-
torney at that time. When I took the girls to the 
187 hospital I reported the accident to the police 
station. I don't know how Mr. Irvine knew that 
I saw the accident. I talked to the police and he 
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was working for the city. I reported to the police. 
That is all. 
NORMA CHAMBERLAIN, a witness on be-
half of the defendant, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
My name is Norma Chamberlain and J am 
25 years old and live in Salt Lake City. My home 
is in Cedar Valley but I have lived in Salt Lake 
five years and am working on Second Avenue. 
188 Vera Cook is in Cedar Valley. I was in the Af-
fleck truck the day of the accident. I was sit-
ting next to Kenneth Butte and had been acquaint-
ed with him before that day. We went down 
189 Third A venue and Butte delivered at an address 
on Third A venue. We stopped at all stop signs. 
There is one on N Street and one on Virginia 
Street. As we were going down Third A venue we 
were traveling about 25 miles an hour, at the regu· 
lar speed. As we approached K Street I saw a 
car in front of the grocery store. I saw it then 
190 it shot up in front of us. It was near the inter-
section. I saw it on K Street (referring to Ex-
hibit D) down here at a point at the south end 
of the line running down the center of K Street 
in the middle of the street from the south curb 
line to Third A venue. At that time our car was 
at a point at the east end of the dotted line run-
ning east in about the middle of Third Avenue. 
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I have driven an automobile for about eight years. 
I have lost my driver's license but haven't had 
it taken away from me. I had a license. I have 
observed automobiles and speeds of automobiles. 
I saw the coupe as it came up K Street into Third 
Avenue. It was going fast, I should judge about 
40 miles an hour. It shot up in front of us. Ken-
neth put down on his brakes and tried to turn off 
and avoid the accident. He turned north and I 
didn't know anything after that. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION: 
I was acquainted with Mr. Butte and have 
been to entertainments with him. He passed by in 
his truck and I got in. Miss Cook and I were 
sitting on a ginger ale box. We were carrying on 
195 a general conversation. I did not observe the 
speedometer but am giving my best judgment as 
to the speed. The coupe just loomed right up in 
195Y2 
front. 
Q. Now, Miss Chamberlain, do you recall 
testifying on April4, 1938, right in this same court-
room, the same place where you are sitting now, 
in the case of the State of Utah versus Kenneth 
Butte? Do you recall testifying as a witness in his 
behalf? 
MR. STEW ART: I object to the question 
and assign it as an improper question, and pre-
judicial misconduct. 
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MR. METOS: J just want to get the time 
and place, Your Honor. 
MR. STEW ART: T ask the court to instruct 
the jury to disregard the question in the form that 
it was put. 
MR. METOS: This is cross-examination 
now, and you have to put it in any form. 
MR. STEW ART: T haven't any objection to 
your fixing the time and place, and the date. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
196 Q. Do you remember being cross-examined 
by Marion Romney, the District Attorney? 
A. Yes. I want to say that the car loomed 
In front of me, I saw it before it came in front 
of us. I saw it then it was in front of me. 
Q. Did you see it right in front of you? 
That is what I mean? You saw it when it was in 
front of you, for the first time? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Now, let me call your attention to this. 
Right after the accident you made out an af-
fidavit to-you gave a statement to a man by 
the name of Parkinson, who is an adjuster for an 
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insurance company? 
MR. STEWART: Just a moment. 
197 MR. METOS. I want to know. 
MR. STEW ART: Just a moment, if Your 
Honor please: I assign that as prejudicial mis~ 
conduct. Mr. Parkinson is associated with me. I 
take an exception to counsel's statement and at 
this time I ask that the jury be discharged; pre-
judicial misconduct of the worst kind, and conn~ 
sel there knows it is, or should know it. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q. You made a statement to him, did you 
not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you stated to him, when he took 
your statement, that when you saw the Ford car 
it was going 35 miles an hour, didn't you? 
A. Yes, about that. 
198 I don't remember making a statement in an-
swer to Mr. Romney that I didn't make such a 
statement to Mr. Parkinson. I don't remember 
making it. 
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MR. STEW ART: I have her statement here 
if you want to see it, the original affidavit that 
she signed, if you want to see it. If you want to 
see it, I will be glad to let you have it. 
MR. l\fETOS: That isn't the one. 
MR. STEW ART: That is the affidavit that 
she made to Mr. Parkinson,-the statement she 
made to him on January 28, 1938. 
199 I don't remember telling the police officers 
the car was right in front of us when I first 
saw it. I thought I told them I saw the car and 
then it loomed up in front of me. I don't remem-
200 her telling the officers that I was uncertain which 
car was in the intersection first. I remember say-
ing I did not notice the speedometer during the 
trip. I remember saying that we were near K 
Street still driving at the same speed when a car 
201 loomed up in front of us. I don't remember ex-
actly what I said. 
202 MR. STEWART: I want the record to show 
that the court is permitting the witness to refresh 
her recollection, not from any statement made by 
her, but from a report, or a copy of a report, of 
E. H. Christensen and G. M. Hopkins, and not a 
statement signed by this witness, and she is 
reading a hearsay report signed by the officers. 
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It would not he proper to so use such a hearsay 
report to refresh the recollection of this witness. 
MR. METOS: I don't want to refresh her 
recollection, Your Honor. I just want to show her 
this thing, and see whether or not she did make 
this statement. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
Q. (By ~fr. Metos) Will you answer that 
question? 
A. I don't remember of saying when I first 
saw the car that it loomed up in front of me, 
but I know I saw the car before. I don't remem-
ber saying that I saw the car for the first time 
when it loomed up in front of me. 
203 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
The paper marked Exhibit 4 has my signature 
on the last page. It is dated January 28, 1938. I 
was taken directly to the hospital and that is 
204 where the officers talked with me. I don't remem-
ber signing anything for the officers. They saw me 
the day of the accident. When Mr. Parkinson 
talked with me on January 28th he showed me 
the statement made by Vera Cook. The writing 
on the last page is written by me. Her stateme~t 
was correct except in one respect. She didn't see 
205 the car hut I did. In my statement on January 
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28th to Mr. Parkinson I signed that her statment 
was correct except that I did see the car going 
north. 
MR. METOS: Just a minute, please. I ob-
ject, Your Honor, on the ground that it is incom-
petent, irrelevant and immaterial, and hearsay, 
what she said to Mr. Parkinson. 
MR. STEW ART: You went into the state-
ment she made to Mr. Parkinson. 
THE COURT: The objection IS sustained. 
MR. STEWART: Exception. 
Q. Did you or did you not see the north-
hound car before it was right in front of you and 
as it was entering from the south? 
A. Yes sir. 
MR. BERNSTEIN: I object to that. Just 
a minute-let my objection show before she an-
swered the question. I object to it as incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial and repetitious, and 
not proper redirect examination. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
206 L. H. PETERSON, a witness called on behalf 
of the defendant, being first duly sworn, testi-
fied as follows: 
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DIRt~CT EXAMINATION 
My name is L. H. Peterson and live at 
162 I Street. I operate a service station on the 
corner of Third A venue and E and was so oper-
ating a station on January 27, 1938. I recall the 
accident at Third A venue and L Street involving 
a D. A. Affleck truck. I was half of a small block 
from where the accident occurred. I was between 
J and K Street going east. I was driving along 
20? probably 20 or 25 miles an hour and slowed up be-
cause I had seen those cars traveling pretty fast 
going up this hill. I have seen so many accidents 
there. I was going up the street and saw the Franz 
coupe and the next thing I seen I seen the car, the 
truck, swirl around there in the middle of the 
street. I saw the coupe before it reached in front 
of the Gem Grocery. There is quite a clear vision 
and I saw the car before it entered the intersec-
tion about, oh, 10 feet I should imagine. I have 
driven a car about twenty years and observed 
speeds and ridden in them. I would say the coupe 
208 was going pretty fast. Yes I do. I should judge 
35 to 40 miles an hour. It did not appear to slow 
down as it entered the intersection. I saw the Af-
fleck truck coming but I couldn't say as to the 
speed. I couldn't judge its speed anywhere near 
as accurate as a car going in front of me. I saw 
the truck and it looked like they weren't going 
209 to make it. The car was traveling just a little too 
fast, I couldn't state how fast the truck was 
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I was the first one right on the scene. I wouldn't 
be honest with you to give an estimate as to the 
speed of the truck. It wasn't going nearly as fast 
as the other car, I know that, or there would have 
been something worse happen. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
I am working for myself. I lease from the 
Utah Oil & Refining Company. I talked to the of-
ficers at the scene of the accident. I don't know 
210 who the officers were. I didn't want to be brought 
up here on the witness stand, to be honest with 
you. I remained at the scene of the accident until 
they took the pictures. They had taken the girls 
away and were taking pictures. I don't know 
who was taking pictures. I might have talked with 
211 the officers but don't remember what I said. I 
came here because Dave Parkinson came down 
there and was-heard I was up there and I was 
requested to come today. I took care of Dave 
Parkinson's car until he moved out of the neigh-
212 borhood. Parkinson wanted to find out about the 
accident. I didn't write anything down. He came 
down and talked with me and I told him what 
I knew. I made no written statement. They don't 
travel pretty fast on Third A venue because there 
are so many accidents. They still try to make this 
hill in high. I have seen them go up E Street. 
213 They try to make it in high. I am right on the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
103 
Ulfs. Tr. 
PaJte 
corner. I see it. I have driven a Ford. I know that 
a Ford will go 40 miles an hour in second gear. 
You can go 50 miles an hour in second gear. I was 
about half way on one of those avenue blocks 
214 between J and K. The truck was coming west, 
the coupe was going north. There was nothing to 
stop me from seeing the truck but as I say you 
cannot tell as near accurate from here to the 
door as you can from here to across the room. I 
215 saw the coupe coming along here before it entered 
the edge of that store. You can see at least 10 or 
15 feet before the coupe entered the intersection. 
The car going up K street was traveling pretty 
218 fast. I see them all the time. The majority of 
people go fast up there. 65 or ?0 per cent of the 
people try to make those avenues on high gear. 
With the present day automobile they can do it. 
They can go to the top of Eleventh A venue and 
E Street 40 miles an hour right to Eleventh Ave-
nue. They don't generally go fast going east and 
219 west. I didn't tell Mr. Parkinson the coupe was go-
ing 45 miles an hour. I told him just the way I saw 
the car was going. If I told him any speed I said 
the same speed I am stating right now here in this 
court, 35 to 40 miles an hour. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION: 
I didn't want to testify in this case. I was 
very busy today but as a matter of courtesy I 
came down. 
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MR. STEW ART: I understand it may be 
stipulated that at the dose of the testimony photo-
graph may be taken of the blackboard for the pur-
pose of making such photograph a part of the 
record in this case. 
MR. METOS: And introduce it as an ex-
hibit. 
MR. STEWART: Yes, introduce it as an ex-
hibit, and the photograph take the place of the 
blackboard. 
MR. BERNSTEIN: I think before it is done 
some of those marks should be identified. 
MR. STEWART: Anything that isn't suf-
ficient, we have no objection to having them 
identified, but, at this time, we will offer the 
blackboard, as Exhibit D in evidence. 
THE COURT: Exhibit D may be received. 
MR. STEWART: And then the photograph 
may be substituted in the record. 
MR. METOS: That is right. 
221 KENNETH BUTTE, testified in his own be-
half, as follows: 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION: 
My name is Kenneth Butte and I am 26 
years old. I am now living in Nevada. On the 
27th day of January. 1938, I was driving the Af-
fleck truck. The photographs, Exhibit 2 and ), 
fairly represent the condition of K Street the day 
222 of the accident. Exhibit 3 fairly represents the 
condition of K Street looking south. 
Exhibits 2 and 3 were offered and received 
in evidence without objection. 
The overall length of a 1936 Ford coupe is 
223 15 feet 6Y2 inches. The overall width is 5 feet 
10 inches. On the day of the accident I was de-
livering in the northeast section of the city. I 
224 made the last delivery to Howard D. Travis and 
offered to take the girls down town. I proceeded 
west on Third A venue to Alta Street or Virginia 
Street and stopped for the sign and then went 
west on Third Avenue to N Street. I stopped there 
225 for a stop sign. I then proceeded west from N 
Street at, oh, 25 or 30 miles an hour. I wasn't 
watching my speedometer all the way but that 
is my best judgment. I have been more or less 
familiar with the speed of automobiles without 
226 constantly watching my speedometer. At K Street 
and Third Avenue I collided with another car. 
As I was just about to enter the intersection I 
saw a Ford coupe coming north on K Street. I 
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saw he wasn't going to stop or try to stop, came 
right up the middle of K Street at a very good 
rate of speed and seeing that if I didn't turn to 
the right and put on my brakes and try to parallel 
this coupe that he would crash into my left side 
so I put on my brakes and turned to the right 
and he caught the left front bumper, the left fen-
der of my car and the front of my car hit his 
right side just about in front of the back bumper. 
The bumper must have caught in his car, and the 
227 speed of his car ,just whipped the rear end of 
my truck right around. Pretty soon the truck just 
couldn't take it any more and it rolJed over on 
its side. When I first saw this car coming I was 
about 15 or 20 feet east of the intersection. When 
r first saw the coupe it was a little further 
south from the south curb line of K Street than 
I was east of the east curb line. I imagine it was 
within, oh, about 35 or 40 feet of the south in-
tersection of K Street. When it entered the inter-
section I imagine it was going at a pretty good 
rate of speed, 35 or 40 miles an hour, right in the 
middle of the road. He didn't put on any brakes 
and he didn't seem to swerve out or anything, 
he just came right up the middle of the street. 
From the time I first saw him and the time of 
the crash was just a flash. I saw I couldn't miss 
him if I didn't turn and finally he was right into 
my left side, and just loomed up in the street, 
228 and we hit. I took my foot off the gas as I ap-
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proached the intersection. I put on my brakes and 
turned to the north. At the time I applied my 
brakes I don't know exactly the speed, about 25 
miles an hour. It could have been a couple miles 
off from that. I was going slower than he was. 
229 I was not in a hurry and neither of the girls re-
quested me to hurry. Neither of them said any-
thing about ·being late in keeping an appooint-
ment. 
Q. From the time that you saw this north-
bound coupe-when you first saw it-did you do 
everything that you, in that instant thought that 
you could do in an effort to avoid an accident? 
MR. METOS: I object to that as calling 
for a conclusion of the witness. 
230 THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
The accident occurred approximately in the 
center of K Street slightly north of the center 
line of Third A venue. When the collision oc-
curred the coupe was facing north and my truck 
was in kind of a northwesterly direction. I ob-
served the tire marks on the road. The mark 
231 which runs west on Exhibit D from point Y 
was not a straight mark. It ran in a kind of a 
northwesterly direction. It wasn't just a single 
mark. That single line is wrong. There was more 
232 than one mark. There was two. The other mark 
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was right along here immediately below this 
dotted line. The tire marks did not run straight 
east and west. They went straight east and west 
for a ways and then swerved north. 
MR. STEW ART: In your opinion, and in 
your judgment, which car entered the intersection 
first, your truck or the coupe? 
MR. METOS: I object to that as calling for 
a conclusion. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
Q. In your judgment, from what you saw, 
which car entered the intersection first, your car 
or the northbound coupe? 
MR. METOS: We object to that on the 
ground it is calling for the conclusion of this 
witness. The same question as the other. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to what 
would have been the result so far as the collision 
is concerned, if you had not applied your brakes 
and turned your wheels to the right? 
MR. METOS: We object to that on the 
ground it is calling for a conclusion of this wit-
ness. 
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THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. STEWART: That is all. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION: 
.My recollection is a little better than in Jan-
uary. 1938. When my deposition was taken I said 
that I put on my brakes and swerved to the 
right and saw this car the first time it was on 
the intersection. I recall thinking the thing over, 
236 the position the cars were in when they hit. I 
said it was right to my left. I didn't say in my 
237 deposition that the first time I saw it was when 
it was in the intersection. I didn't testify to that, 
not to my knowledge. I said I saw that car just 
as a flash. I might have made a statement to 
238 the officers that I did not see the car until you 
got right almost right on it and then saw the 
car loom right before me. I might have made 
that statement, I was pretty well jammed up 
right after the accident. I might have said that I 
was unable to say how fast the other car was 
going as it loomed right in front of me. Yes sir 
239 I swerved to the north and he did not even apply 
any brake or anything or decrease his speed, just 
kept coming. On this particular day I wasn't 
240 late. I had not had my lunch yet. I was late for 
243 my lunch hut wasn't in a hurry. Going down 
Third A venue I was in the right zone for traffic, 
about 10 or 12 feet from the curb in that vicinity. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
110 
Oft's. Tr. 
Page h th I didn't swerve my car very far tot e nor , may-
256 
264 
be two or three feet. Yes in my deposition on 
page 9 I said that as I approached the intersection 
I saw a car right to my left. I put on my brakes 
and swerved to the right. It was on the intersec-
tion, practically in front of me. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION: 
When I said in my deposition that the car 
was to my ]eft I can show you what I meant. 
When I was about here-when I said the car 
was to my left, when I got to about the inter-
section I saw the car to my left down here, 
meaning to my left as I was proceeding into the 
265 intersection. When I said in my deposition just as 
I got to the intersection I did not mean in the 
exact instant my front wheels crossed the imagin-
ary curb line. I meant just as I approached the 
intersection. On page 10 and 11 of my deposition 
when I was asked whether I saw it right in front 
of me, I answered, I saw it to my left, and in 
266 the next question in answer to the question how 
far to my left, I answered, oh, not every far, 
about 20 feet or 30 feet. When I answered the 
question that I just saw the car as a flash I 
meant that he flashed right in front of me. When 
268 I answered about seeing the tire marks I meant 
that I did not examine them right after the ac-
cident before going to the hospital. In the deposi-
tion on page 140 I stated that it was my best 
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estimation the ear was going Y> or 40 miles an 
hour. The right front fender on my truck was 
not damaged. 
Defendant rests. 
MR. STE,VART: (Jury excused from court 
room) If Your Honor please, I have submitted and 
handed to the court a requested instruction in con-
nection ·with the question of insurance, and I 
have done so without waiving the request twice 
made for a mistrial. 
At this time I want the record to clearly 
show that at approximately the close or at the 
close of the case, plaintiff's counsel's examination 
of the jury and before I examined them, that 
counsel asked each and every one of the fourteen 
prospective jurors, including all of the women, 
whether they were officers, directors or agents of 
the Northwest Casualty Company; and I assign 
that as prejudicial. 
MR. MET OS: And stockholders. 
MR. STEW ART: And stockholders; and I 
assign that as prejudicial misconduct, and re-
quest the discharge of the jury. 
Subsequently, and during the trial, counsel 
297 In asking a question of one of the witnesses, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
112 
Oft's. Tr. 
"(l""{' b ·f h stated in substance, or asked in su stance, 1 sue 
witness did not make a certain statement to Mr. 
Parkinson, the insurance company adjuster, at 
which time I assigned the asking of any such 
question as prejudicial misconduct, and again re-
quest the court to discharge the jury. 
It is my firm belief that the misconduct in 
the respects mentioned were prejudicial, and that 
no instruction that the court could possibly give 
would eradicate from the minds of the jurors the 
suggestions or implications upon the questions ask-
ed both of the jurors and of the one witness re-
ferred to, and that those jurors, and each of them, 
in going into the jury room will have those sug-
gestions and implications in the back of their 
minds. 
In requesting an instruction such as I have 
requested, or in making any instruction on that 
subject, I do not do so with the belief that an in-
struction will cure the error, and we do not waive 
the motions heretofore made for a mistrial and 
discharge of the jury, by making such a request. 
THE COURT: Let the record show coun· 
ser s remarks. 
298 The blackboard, Exhibit D, was received in 
evidence without objection. It was also stipulated 
that the width of Third A venue was 50 feet in-
stead of 45 as testified to by police officers. 
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The jury was instructed in part as follows: 
No. 11 
145 You are instructed that the law imposes 
a duty on every person who operates an auto-
mobile to keep a proper lookout ahead and to ex-
ercise ordinary and reasonable care and vigilance 
under the conditions and circumstances sur-
rounding him, which means that degree of care 
which the circumstances and surroundings require 
and which is commensurate with the danger that 
may he encountered. In this case it was the duty 
of the defendant, Kenneth Butte, to drive his 
automobile on said highway, using reasonable 
care and prudence so that he could avoid injur-
ing anyone or colliding with any person on the 
highway, and while operating said automobile 
thereon, it was his duty to keep a careful and pru-
dent lookout for pedestrians and other cars on 
said highway and intersection and to give warn-
ing, if necessary, of his approach with said auto-
mobile and to avoid colliding with them, and 
it was his duty to drive said car at such speed 
which would permit him to exercise control of 
the same so as to decrease speed, or to stop, if 
necessary, in the exercise of due care, to avoid 
colliding with any person, or other car, on the 
highway. 
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No. 12 
You are instruded that it is provided by the 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City that it is unlawful 
for any person to drive a vehicle in a residential 
district in excess of 25 miles per hour; and you are 
instructed that if, in this case, you find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that at the time 
and place complained of the defendant, Kenneth 
Butte, drove his truck at a speed in excess of 25 
miles per hour and that such speed was the prox-
imate cause of the accident and injuries result-
ing in the death of Spero George Saltas, and that 
the said Spero George Saltas was free from con-
tributory negligence as herein defined, then your 
verdict must be for the plaintiff and against 
the defendant. 
No. 13 
147 You are instructed that it is provided by the 
ordinance:;; of Salt Lake City that it shall be un-
lawful for any person to drive a vehicle on any 
street in Salt Lake City at a speed greater than 
is reasonable and prudent, having due regard 
for the traffic, surface, and width of the highway 
and the hazard at intersections, and any other 
conditions existing, and no person shall drive at 
a speed which is greater than will permit the 
driver to exercise proper control of the vehicle 
and to decrease the speed, or to stop, as may be 
necessary to avoid colliding with any person, 
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vehicle. or other eonveyance upon, or entering, 
the highway, in compliance with legal require-
ments, and with the duty of drivers and other 
persons using the street to exercise due care; and, 
if you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
in this case that the driver of said truck drove 
said truck in violation of said ordinance and that 
said violation was the proximate cause of the 
accident and injuries resulting in the death of 
said Spero George Saltas, and that the said Spero 
George Saltas was free from contributory negli-
gence as herein defined, then your verdict must 
he for the plaintiff and against the defendant. 
No. 14 
148 You are instructed that it is provided by the 
laws of this State that the driver of a vehicle ap-
proaching an intersection shall yield the right of 
way to a vehicle which has first entered the inter-
section. When two vehicles enter the intersection 
at the same time, the driver of the vehicle 
on the left shall yield to the driver on the right. 
You are therefore instructed that if in this case 
you are satisfied by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that at the time and place complained 
of the Franz car in which the deceased was rid-
ing entered the intersection of Third A venue and 
"K" Street before the defendant's truck entered 
the same, then the Franz car had the right of 
way over the defendant's truck and it was the 
truck driver's duty to yield the right of way to 
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the Franz car, and if you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the failure of the de-
fendant to yield said right of way to the Franz 
car, if you shall believe that the Franz car had 
the right of way, was the proximate cause of 
the injury to the deceased, then your verdict 
must be for the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant. 
No. 15 
149 You are instructed that the deceased, Spero 
George Saltas, at the time of the collision, was 
an invitee, or guest, of Gerald Franz, the driver 
of the automobile in which he was riding, and if 
you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the deceased was injured by reason of the 
negligent acts of the defendant, and as a proxi-
mate cause thereof, as alleged in plaintiff's com-
plaint, and that said Spero George Saltas was 
free from contributory negligence as herein de-
fined, then the fact that the driver of the car in 
which the deceased was riding, if you find such 
to be the fact, was also guilty of negligence in 
the operation of his car and his negligence con-
tributed to the accident and injuries resulting in 
the death of said deceased, such negligence on 
the part of Gerald Franz would be no defense in 
this action, and your verdict must be in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendant. 
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151 You are instructed that if by a preponderance 
of the evidence you shall find that at the time 
the Franz car had entered the intersection of 
Third Avenue and ·'K .. Street. the defendant's 
truck was at a point east of said intersection, 
then you are instructed that the driver of the car 
in which the deceased was riding was entitled to 
assume that the driver of the truck would pro-
ceed in a lawful manner and yield the right of 
way to him, and if by a preponderance of the evi-
dence you shall further find that the driver of 
the truck so failed to proceed in a lawful manner 
and yield the right of way to the Franz car and 
that such failure was the proximate cause of the 
accident and injuries therein complained of, your 
verdict must be for the plaintiff and against the 
defendant. 
The court refused to give the following in-
structions requested by the defendant, Kenneth 
Butte, to which exception was duly taken. (Dft. 
Tr. 323): 
No. '7 
186 While the deceased, Spero Saltas, was a 
guest in the automobile driven by Gerald Franz, 
and the negligence, if any, of Gerald Franz is, 
therefore, not imputable to him, that does not neces-
sarily mean that the defendant is liable in this 
action in the event you find that defendant was 
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negligent. Negligence alone is of no consequence 
unless it proximately causes or contributes to 
cause an accident. Defendant may be negligent 
and such negligence may not be a proximate 
cause. In order for negligence of a defendant to 
be the proximate cause of an accident such acci-
dent must be the natural and probable result of the 
negligence of the defendant and be of such char-
acter as an ordinarily prudent person would have 
known or would or ought to have foreseen would 
probably result in an accident. It is also that 
cause from which the injury results, unbroken by 
a sequence of events put in motion by a third per-
son, which defendant could not reasonably have 
foreseen and expected. Therefore, in this case, 
even though you find from the evidence that 
defendant was negligent, yet if the accident was 
not the natural and probable result of such neg-
ligence and the negligence, if any, of the defend-
ant was not of such a character as an ordinarily 
prudent person would have known or would or 
ought to have seen might probably result in an 
accident, but the accident was caused by the in-
dependent act of Gerald Franz, which act could 
not reasonably have been foreseen and expected 
by the defendant, then such negligence, if any, of 
the defendant would not be the proximate cause 
of the accident and your verdict should be for the 
defendant. 
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No. 13 
195 You are instructed that if Gerald Franz. the 
driver of the automobile in which deceased was 
riding, could in the exercise of reasonable care, 
have avoided the acc1dent by yielding the right 
of way or slowing down or keeping a pi'oper look-
out or other means, that it was his duty to do so, 
and if he did not, he was negligent, and if such 
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the 
accident, your verdict must be in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff, although you 
should also find that the defendant was negligent. 
No. 14 
196 You are instructed that the defendant in this 
action claims that the accident was unavoidable 
so far as he is concerned, that is, that it was 
not the result of any negligence on his part, but 
resulted from a combination of circumstances 
not the result of any act or failure of said de-
fendant. The law does not permit a recovery for 
an accident which is unavoidable so far as de-
fendant is concerned, but leaves the loss to he 
horne by him on whom it falls, and if in this case 
you find that the accident and resulting death of 
Spero Saltas was unavoidable insofar as the de-
fendant in this action is concerned, then your 
verdict must he in favor of defendant. 
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No. 15 
19? You are further instructed that an accident 
which could not have been reasonably foreseen 
or reasonably anticipated as the probable result 
of negligence is not actionable and creates no 
liability. Therefore, even though you find in this 
case that the defendant was negligent, yet if you 
also find that defendant could not in the exercise 
of reasonable and ordinary care have foreseen 
or reasonably anticipated that an accident would 
probably result from such negligence, but that 
the accident in fact resulted from a condition 
over which the defendant had no control and 
which he could not reasonably have expected 
would result in causing an accident, then your 
verdict must be in favor of the defendant. 
No. 18 
201 You have been instructed on the duty of the 
driver of an automobile to keep a careful look-
out. In this case, Gerald Franz had the duty in 
approaching Third Avenue to keep a lookout, 
particularly for automobiles approaching from 
his right. A person who attempts to cross an in-
tersection looking directly ahead without looking 
up intersecting streets for approaching vehicles 
must be deemed guilty of negligence. While there 
is no specific standard as to the extent of obser-
vation, nevertheless the observation of the driver 
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of an automobile for approaching traffic should 
be at the first opportunity and at a point where 
observation will be reasonably effieicnt for self-
protection. If the circumstances are such that a 
prudent person would have observed an automo-
bile approaching the intersection and in view of 
its speed and other circumstances, it would appear 
to him that such automobile would continue across 
the intersection, then the failure to keep a look-
out and make repeated observations would con-
stitute negligence. The duty is not met by merely 
looking. He must not only look, but must ob-
serve the traffic and the general situation in the 
vicinity. He must look in such an intelligent and 
careful manner as to enable him to see what a 
person in the exercise of ordinary care and cau-
tion for the safety of himself and others could 
have seen under like circumstances. If you find 
in this case that the said Gerald Franz either 
failed to keep such a careful lookout for auto-
mobiles approaching from his right as in this 
instruction set forth, or if you find that he looked 
and failed to see what was visible to be seen had 
he looked, then the said Gerald Franz was negli-
gent. Also if the said Gerald Franz either saw 
the truck driven by defendant, or should have 
seen the same in time to avoid the accident and 
failed to apply his brakes or otherwise control 
his automobile in an effort to avoid said acci-
dent, the said Gerald Franz was negligent. If you 
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find that the said Gerald Franz was negligent 
as in this instruction or in the other instructions 
set forth and that such negligence on his part 
was the sole proximate cause of the accident, 
then your verdict must be for the defendant. 
No. 19 
200 You are instructed that there is no evidence 
Dffs. Tr. 
Page 
320 
In this case that the defendant, Kenneth Butte, 
failed to keep a proper lookout in approaching the 
intersection of Third Avenue and K Street and 
that claim of negligence against the defendant 
Is therefore withdrawn from your consideration. 
During the argument of Mr. Metos to the 
jury the following occurred: 
MR. STEWART: I want the record to show 
that counsel is reading from the deposition that 
was taken before the first trial. 
MR. MET OS: All right. "When you ap-
proached the intersection did you see any car?" 
That is the question. 
MR. STEWART: Now, if Your Honor 
please, I assign counsel's reading of the deposition 
as unprofessional conduct on his part, and assign 
it as error in this case, and ask the court to in-
struct the jury to disregard it. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Oft's. Tr. 
p~ 
123 
MR. METOS: What is the deposition for 
if we cannot read it? 
THE COURT: You are only reading what 
you asked the witness in this case? 
MR. METOS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. STEW ART: Exception. 
321 After the jury left the courtroom at the con-
clusion of the arguments and before the instruc-
tions and exhibits were delivered to the jury, 
the following took place: 
MR. STEW ART: Before these instructions 
are given I would like to have the court approve 
my showing in the record that Mr. Metos, in his 
closing argument to the jury, in discussing the 
question as to whether or not the defendant was 
at a disadvantage, stated the fact that on the day 
of the accident an investigator was out at the 
scene of the accident in this case; and, further, 
in his closing argument to the jury stated in sub-
stance, that the defendant secured an attorney 
who spends all his time in the defense of this 
class of cases. May I have the record show that? 
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THE COURT: Yes, the record may so show. 
MR. MET OS: Let the record show we deny 
we made those statements in that language and 
in that form. I want to show the investigator was 
out there that day or soon thereafter. 
MR. STEWART: The statement that I made 
was substantially correct. 
322 THE COURT: Well, I think with the qual-
ification as to the inspector going soon thereafter, 
IS a proper qualification. 
MR. STEWART: Otherwise my statement 
is correct? 
MR. MET OS: Yes. 
323 MR. STEWART: Comes now the defendant 
and takes the following exceptions to the court's 
instructions to the jury: 
324 The defendant excepts to Instruction No. 11, 
and to the whole thereof. 
Further excepts to Instruction No. 11, and 
particularly to the following words: "For pedes-
trians." Also to that part of said Instruction: "And 
to give warning." Also to that part of Instruction 
No. 11, as follows: "And to avoid colliding with 
them." 
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Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 12, and 
to the whole thereof. 
Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 13, and 
to the whole thereof. 
Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 14, and 
to the whole thereof, and particularly the failure 
in said instruction to include the element of the 
deceased's own failure to use reasonable and or-
dinary care, it appearing from said instruction 
that if the defendant was negligent, as in said 
instruction described, that plaintiff could recover 
even though the deceased himself was negligent in 
failing to use ordinary care for his own safety. 
Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 15, and 
to the whole thereof. 
Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 16, and 
to the whole thereof, and more particularly for 
the failure to give defendant's requested instruc-
tion covering the same subject matter. 
Defendant excepts to Instruction No. 17, and 
to the whole thereof, and particularly excepts to 
that part reading as follows: "The defendant's 
325 truck was at a point east of said intersection." 
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The instruction, as given, m effect tells the 
jury that if the defendant's truck was one foot 
or one inch east of the east curb line of K Street 
when Gerald Franz entered the intersection, or 
was one foot or one inch into the intersection~ 
that defendant was required to yield the right of 
way. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 1. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 2, as re-
quested. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 4, as re-
quested. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 5, as re-
quested. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 6. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 7. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 8, as re· 
quested. 
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Defendant except to the refusal of the eourt 
to give his requested Instruction No. 1 t. as re-
quested. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 13. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 14. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
326 to give his requested Instruction No. 15. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 16, as re-
quested. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 18. 
Defendant excepts to the refusal of the court 
to give his requested Instruction No. 19. 
The defendant also excepts to the refusal of 
the court to submit to the jury special interroga-
tories, which, if given and answered, would have 
enabled the court to determine the correctness of 
the verdict of the jury; that is, whether it was 
based upon proper application of the law to the 
facts found by the jury. 
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On the 12th day of May, 1939, a six to two 
verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, for 
the sum of $3,061.00 and judgment was entered 
thereon. 
209 On the 15th day of May, 1939, the defendant, 
Kenneth Butte, filed his motion herein to set 
aside the second verdict and reinstate the previous 
verdict, which motion is as follows: 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND 
REINSTATE PREVIOUS VERDICT 
TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED AND TO 
HARRY METOS AND SAMUEL BERN-
STEIN, HIS ATTORNEYS: 
The defendant, Kenneth Butte, hereby moves 
the court to set aside the verdict entered herein 
on the 12th day of May, 1939, and reinstate the 
verdict of the jury and the judgment entered 
thereon, which verdict and judgment was for the 
sum of $800.00, upon the following grounds: 
1. That the court had no authority or right 
to make the alternative order to increase the 
judgment to $2400.00 or grant a new trial. 
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2. That the verdict for $800.00 against the 
defendant, Kenneth Butte, was not insufficient. 
3. That the court could not set up its judg-
ment, opinion or feeling concerning such verdict 
as against the finding and decision of the jury. 
4. That the alternative order was contrary 
to and against the law. 
GERALD IRVINE, 
RALPH T. STEWART, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kenneth Butte. 
211 On the 15th day of May, 1939, the defend-
ant. Kenneth Butte, served and filed his motion 
for a new trial as follows: 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MOVE FOR AND 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED AND TO 
H. G. METOS AND SAMUEL BERNSTEIN, 
IDS ATTORNEYS: 
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE 
TAKE NOTICE that the defendant, Kenneth 
Butte, one of the defendants in the above entitled 
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cause, intends to move, and does hereby move, to 
set aside the verdict of the jury rendered herein 
on the 12th day of May, 1939, and to grant a new 
trial in the above entitled cause upon the follow-
ing grounds, to-wit: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court 
and orders of the court by which the defendant 
was prevented from having a fair trial. 
2. Abuse of discretion by the court which 
prevented the defendant from having a fair trial. 
3. Newly discovered evidence material for 
the defendant which he could not with reasonable 
diligence have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
4. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict. 
5. That the verdict IS contrary to and is 
against the law. 
6. Error in law occurring at the trial and 
excepted to by the defendant. 
This motion will be and is made and based 
212 upon the minutes, records and files of the court 
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in the above entitled cause and upon affidavits 
to he hereafter submitted and filed herein. 
GERALD IRVINE & RALPH T. STEW ART. 
Afforne,l}s for Defendant 
Kenneth Butte. 
220 May 20, 1939. the motion of the defendant, 
Kenneth Butte, for a new trial and to vacate 
second verdict and reinstate original verdict was 
duly argued and taken under advisement by the 
court. 
233 On the 2nd day of June, 1939, the court 
denied the motions of the defendant. (See Dft. 
Tr. p. 2) 
224 Three of the jurors upon the second trial 
made affidavit that during the deliberations of 
the jury one of the jurors stated that he was in 
favor of sticking the insurance company and that 
all of the jurors had in mind that an insurance 
company would have to pay the judgment. 
129 That on the 19th day of April, 1939, an order 
was duly made and entered herein allowing the 
defendant, Kenneth Butte, to and including the 
15th day of June, 1939, in which to prepare, serve, 
settle and file his wayside hill of exceptions. 
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On the 5th day of June, 1939, an order was 
duly entered allowing the defendant, Kenneth 
Butte, to and including the 1st day of September, 
1939, in which to prepare, serve, settle and file 
his wayside bill of exceptions. 
Stipulation providing that the ,judgment roll 
upon plaintiff's appeal should be transmitted to 
the Supreme Court for use of both appellants on 
their respective appeals. 
438 Within the time allowed by law and the 
Dffs. Tr. 
Page 
orders of the court plaintiff's transcript of the 
evidence, together with the proceedings, orders 
and rulings of the court, was settled as a wayside 
bill of exceptions for the defendant, Kenneth 
Butte. 
2 On the 2nd day of June, 1939, the motion of 
Plf's. Tr. 
Page 
235 
Dffs. Tr. 
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1 
the defendant, Kenneth Butte, to set aside the 
verdict and reinstate the first verdict was denied. 
On the 5th day of June, 1939, and within the 
time allowed by law, the defendant, Kenneth 
Butte, was allowed to and including the 1st day 
of September, 1939, in which to prepare, serve, 
settle and file his bill of exceptions herein. 
On the 25th day of August, 1939, and within 
the time allowed by law and the orders of the 
court, the defendant, Kenneth Butte, was allowed 
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Df~!ieTr. 
to and including the tst day of October, 1939. in 
'-1' which to prepare, serve, settle and file his hill 
D.} of exceptions herein. 
3 It was stipulated that the original judgment 
roll filed in the Supreme Court should be con-
sidered as a part of the record of the defendant, 
Kenneth Butte, on his appeal and that subsequent 
proceedings should also be certified to the Su-
preme Court and considered as a part of the 
original judgment roll and that all such should 
be considered and treated as the judgment roll 
of the defendant, Kenneth Butte, on his appeal. 
5 On the 29th day of September, 1939, the de-
fendant, Kenneth Butte, served and filed his No~ 
tice of Appeal as follows: 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO GEORGE SALTAS, PLAINTIFF HEREIN. 
AND HARRY G. METOS, HIS ATTORNEY, 
AND TO DAVID A. AFFLECK, doing busi-
ness under the name and style of D. A. Af-
fleck Grocery, ONE OF DEFENDANTS, 
HEREIN, AND STEW ART, STEW ART AND 
PARKINSON, HIS ATTORNEYS: 
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YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE 
TAKE NOTICE that the defendant, Kenneth 
Butte, one of the defendants herein, hereby ap-
peals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
from the verdict of the jury entered herein on the 
12th day of May, 1939, the judgment entered 
thereon and the refusal and denial of the under-
signed defendant's motion for a new trial, and 
from the whole thereof, including the granting 
by the court of the plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial from the first verdict and judgment entered 
thereon, which motion was granted on the 2nd 
day of March, 1939, and including also the re-
fusal to reinstate the first verdict. 
This appeal is taken on both questions of 
law and fact, including proceedings relating to 
the granting of plaintiff's motion for a new trial, 
the refusal by the court to set aside the second 
verdict and reinstate the first verdict. 
Dated this 29th day of September, 1939. 
GERALD IRVINE, 
RALPH T. STEW ART, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Kenneth Butte. 
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CERTIFICATE OF THE COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 1 
~ ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE J 
I, the undersigned, Clarence E. Baker, the 
judge before whom the above entitled cause was 
tried, do hereby certify that the foregoing hill 
of exceptions, consisting of pages 1 to 31?, with 
17 A to 1? J, inclusive, contains all of the evidence, 
both oral and documentary, offered and received 
in said cause, including all exhibits, which said 
exhibits and documentary evidence when not at-
tached or contained in the transcript of evidence 
are treated and considered as attached to and a 
part of the hill of exceptions, and said proposed 
hill of exceptions contains all objections made, 
rulings by the court and exceptions taken and 
all proceedings on the trial of said cause, and 
the parties have stipulated that the same may he 
settled and filed as the defendant's hill of ex-
ceptions herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the same is hereby 
settled, allowed and approved as and for the hill 
331 of exceptions in the above entitled cause insofar 
as the same do not otherwise appear in the judg-
ment roll or on record. 
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Dated this 29th day of September, 1939. 
ATTEST 
CLARENCE E. BAKER, 
judge. 
WILLIAM J. KORTH, 
Clerk 
By C. L. COUNTRYMAN, 
Deputy Clerk (Seal) 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, WILLIAM J. KORTH, Clerk of the above 
entitled Court do hereby certify that the record 
in the above entitled case, was on the 24th day 
of August, A. D. 1939 transmitted to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, on appeal. 
That the hereto attached papers, including 
the Notice of Cross Appeal, and Bill of Exceptions 
was filed in this office after the said files had been 
transmitted to the Supreme Court, and that the 
same are this date transmitted to the Supreme 
Court to be made a part of the said record on 
Appeal. 
I further certify that the within appellants 
did on the 29th day of September, A. D. 1939, 
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file an Undertaking on Appeal in due form, aud 
that the same was filed on the 29th day of Sep-
tember, A. D. 1939. 
WITNESS my hand and the Seal of said 
court at Salt Lake City. Utah. this 6th day of 
October, A. D. 1939. 
(Seal) 
WILLIAM J. KORTH, 
Clerk Third District Court, 
By ALVIN KEDDINGTON, 
Deputy Clerk. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
Case No. 61 ?'3 
GEORGE SALTAS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID A. AFFLECK, doing busi-
ness under the name and style 
of D. A. AFFLECK GROCERY, 
De{endant, 
KENNETH BUTTE, 
Defendant and Appellant 
ASSIGNMENTS 
OF ERROR 
Comes now the defendant, Kenneth Butte, 
and upon the record heretofore transmitted to and 
filed in this court pursuant to the appeal herein, 
assigns the following errors upon which he will 
rely for a reversal of the verdict of the jury and 
judgment entered thereon on the 12th day of May, 
1939, which judgment became final on the 2nd 
day of June, 1939, upon the trial court over-
ruling and denying his motion for a new trial: 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 1 
The court erred in permitting plaintiff's coun· 
sel to interrog·ate prospective jurors respecting in· 
surance indemnification after it had been made 
to appear that the insurance policy issued to the 
defendant, Affleck, did not extend protection to 
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defendant, Kenneth Butte. and in not holding· that. 
such interrogation would be prejudicial to the de-
fendant. Kenneth Butte. (Dft. Tr. 19-23: Ab. 33-44.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 2 
The court erred in permitting plaintiffs coun-
sel to ask each and every one of the fourteen 
prospective jurors whether or not they were stock-
holders, officers or employees of the Northwest 
Casualty Company, particularly after it had been 
made to appear from the court's examination of 
such jurors that at least twelve of the fourteen 
jurors could not possibly have any such connec-
tion with any insurance company, and in failing 
and refusing to discharge the jury on motion of 
counsel of Kenneth Butte. (Dft. Tr. 23-35; Ab. 
35-44.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 3 
The court erred in failing and refusing to 
grant the motion of the defendant, Kenneth Butte, 
for a discharge of the jury on motion of the de-
fendant, Kenneth Butte, for misconduct of plain-
tiff's counsel in interrogating the jury respecting 
the question of insurance. (Dft. Tr. 296-297; Ab. 
111-112.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 4 
The court erred in overruling the objection 
of the defendant, Kenneth Butte, and in failing 
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and refusing to discharge the jury for prejudicial 
misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in his cross-ex-
amination of Norma Chamberlain, as follows: 
"Q. Now, let me call your attention 
to this. Right after the accident you made 
out an affidavit to-you gave a statement 
to a man by the name of Parkinson, who 
is an adjuster for an insurance company? 
"MR. STEWART: Just a moment. 
"MR. METOS: I wunt to know. 
""MR. STE,VART: Just a moment, if 
Your Honor please; I assign that as pre-
judicial misconduct. Mr. Parkinson is asso-
ciated with me. I take an exception to 
counsel's statement and at this time I ask 
that the jury be discharged; prejudicial 
misconduct of the worst kind, and counsel 
there knows it is, .or should know it. 
"THE COURT: The objection is 
overruled. 
"MR. STE'V ART: At this time I 
want the record to clearly show that at ap-
proximately the close or at the close of the 
case, plaintiff's counsel's examination of 
the jury and before I examined them, that 
counse] asked each and every one of the 
fourteen prospective jurors, including all 
of the women, whether they were officers, 
directors or agents of the Northwest Casu-
alty Company; and I assign that as pre-
judicial. 
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··.MR. ~IETOS: .:\nd :-.ll)ekholdcrs. 
"MR. STE\V ART: And stockholders; 
and I assign that as prejudicial misconduct, 
and request the discharge of the jury. 
"'Subsequently, and during the trial, 
counsel in asking a question of one of the 
witnesses stated in substance or asked in 
substance, if such witness did not make a 
certain statement to Mr. Parkinson, the 
insurance company adjuster, at which 
time I assigned the asking of any such 
question as prejudicial misconduct, and 
again requested the court to discharge the 
jury. 
"It is my firm belief that the misconduct 
in the respects mentioned was prejudicial, 
and that no instruction that the court could 
possibly give would erradicate from the 
minds of the jurors the suggestions or im-
plications upon the questions asked both 
of the jurors and of the one witness refer-
red to, and that those jurors, and each of 
them, in going into the jury room will have 
those suggestions and implications in the 
back of their minds. 
"THE COURT: Let the record show 
counsel's remarks." (Dft. Tr. 196, 197, 296, 
297; Ah. 96, 97, 111, 112.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 5 
That plaintiff's counsel was guilty of wilful 
and prejudicial misconduct in again and in his 
closing argument to the jury suggesting that the 
defendant, Kenneth Butte, was defended by an 
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insurance company which would have to pay the 
verdict, by following up his examination of the 
fourteen jurors, his cross-examination of the wit-
ness Norma Chamberlain, by a statement not sup-
ported by the record, to the effect that an insur-
ance adjuster or investigator was out at the scene 
of the accident the day it occurred and that de-
fendant, Kenneth Butte, secured an attorney who 
spends all of his time in the defense of such 
cases, which record is as follows: 
"MR. STEWART: Before these in-
structions are given I would like to have 
the court approve my showing in the record 
that Mr. Metos, in his closing argument to 
the jury, in discussing the question as to 
whether or not the defendant was at a 
disadvantage, stated the fact that on the 
day of the accident an investigator was out 
at the scene of the accident in this case; 
and, further, in his closing argument to the 
jury stated in substance, that the defend-
ant secured an attorney who spends all 
his time in the defense of this class of 
cases. May I have the record show that? 
"THE COURT: Yes, the record may 
so show. 
"MR. MET OS: Let the record show 
we deny we made those statements in that 
language and in that form. I want to show 
the investigator was out there that day 
or soon thereafter. 
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·"MR. STE\V ART: T h e statement 
that I made was substantially correct. 
"'THE COURT: \Veil. 1 think with 
the qualification as to the inspector going 
soon thereafter. is a proper qualification. 
·".\IR. S T E \V A R T: Otherwise my 
statement is correct? 
""MR. METOS: Yes ... (Dft. Tr. 321-
322: Ab. 123-124.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 6 
The court erred in permitting plaintiff's coun-
sel, over objection, to read to the jury from the 
deposition of the defendant, Kenneth Butte, 
which deposition had not been offered or re-
ceived in evidence, upon the following record: 
".MR. STEWART: I want the record 
to show that counsel is reading from the 
deposition that was taken before the trial . 
.. MR. METOS: All right. 'When you 
approached the intersection did you see 
any car?' That is the question. 
"MR. STEWART: Now, if Your 
Honor please, I assign counsel's reading 
of the deposition as unprofessional conduct 
on his part, and assign it as error in this 
case, and ask the court to instruct the 
jury to disregard it . 
.. MR. METOS: What is the deposi-
tion for if we cannot read it? 
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"THE COURT: You are only read-
ing what you asked the witness in this 
case? 
"MR. MET OS: Yes. 
"THE COURT: You may proceed. 
"MR. STEWART: Exception." (Dft. 
Tr. 320; Ab. 122-123.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. '! 
The court erred in giving to the jury instruc-
tion No. 11, to which instruction defendant duly 
excepted. (PH. Tr. 145: Deft. Tr. 124: Ab. 113, 124.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 8 
The court erred in giving its instruction No. 
12, and particularly in instructing the jury that 
it was unlawful for any person to drive a vehicle 
in a residential district in excess of twenty-five 
miles an hour and that if defendant drove his 
truck at a speed in excess of twenty-five miles an 
hour and that such speed was the proximate 
cause of the accident, and that deceased was free 
from contributory negligence, that a verdict 
should be returned for the plaintiff, and to which 
instruction defendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 146; 
Dft. Tr. 324: Ab. 114, 125.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 9 
The court erred in giving its instruction No. 
13, to which instruction defendant duly excepted. 
(Pff. Tr. 14?: Dft. Tr. 324: Ab. 114, 125.) 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 10 
The court erred in giving its instruction No. 
14, to which instruction defendant duly excepted. 
(Pff. Tr. 148: Deft. Tr. 124: .-\b. tl =>. 12=>.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 11 
The court erred in giving its instruction No. 
15, to which instruction defendant duly excepted. 
(Pff. Tr. 149: Dft. Tr. 324: Ab. 116. 125.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 12 
The court erred in giving its instruction No. 
17, to which instruction defendant duly excepted. 
(Pff. Tr. 151: Dft. Tr. 324: Ab. 11 ?, 125.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 13 
The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested instruction No. ?, to which de-
fendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 186; Dft. Tr. 325; 
Ab. 117, 126.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 14 
The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested instruction No. 13, to which de-
fendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 195; Dft. Tr. 325; 
Ab. 119, 127.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 15 
The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested instruction No. 14, to which de-
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fendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 196; Dft. Tr. 325; 
Ab. 119, 127.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 16 
The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested instruction No. 15, to which de-
fendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 197; Dft. Tr. 326; 
Ab. 120, 127.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 17 
The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested instruction No. 18, to which de-
fendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 201; Dft. Tr. 326; 
Ab. 120, 127.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 18 
The court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested instruction No. 19, to which de-
fendant duly excepted. (Pff. Tr. 200; Dft. Tr. 326; 
Ab. 122, 127.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 19 
The court erred in holding as a matter of law 
that the $800.00 verdict against the defendant 
Kenneth Butte, was inadequate and in granting 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial upon the grounds 
of "inadequate damages appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice" 
and in holding that a verdict may be set aside on 
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the grounds of inadequeney. (Pff. Tr. 92. 4;0. I 19: 
~\h. 27'. 28.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 20 
The court erred in setting up his own personal 
belief or thought as against the unanimous deci-
sion of the jury upon the first trial and as against 
at least three of the jurors upon the second trial 
in holding that as a ma.tter of law the verdict of 
$800.00 was inadequate, particularly in this case 
where liability was so questionable that upon the 
second trial two jurors were unwilling to agree 
upon any verdict for the plaintiff, one juror upon 
such second trial was in favor of an $800.00 verdict 
and all eight jurors upon the first trial agreed 
upon an $800.00 vedict. (Pff. Tr. 92, 430, 119, 224; 
Ah. 2?, 28, 131.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 21 
The court erred in holding that the verdict 
in the first trial was inadequate and in granting 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial when it appeared 
from the evidence that plaintiff suffered no spe-
cial damages; that deceased was thirty years of 
age and plaintiff and two younger sons were 
earning approximately $13.00 a day and that 
damages to plaintiff resulting from deceased's 
death were purely speculative. (Pff. Tr. 92, 430, 
119; Ab. 2?, 28.) 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 22 
The court erred in denying the motion of de-
fendant, Kenneth Butte, to set aside the alterna-
tive order providing that a new trial would he 
granted unless defendant, Kenneth Butte, con-
sented to increase the verdict to $2400.00. (Pff. Tr. 
124, 12?: Ab. 29, 30.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 23 
The court erred in proceeding to retry the 
case as against the defendant, Kenneth Butte, and 
in refusing to sustain the objection of said defend-
ant. (Dft. Tr. 11-18; Ab. 31, 33.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 24 
The court erred in refusing to set aside the 
verdict upon the second trial and reinstate the 
$800.00 verdict returned in the first trial. (Pf£. Tr. 
209, 233; Dft. T r. 2; Ab. 128, 131, 132.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 25 
The court erred in failing and refusing to 
grant defendant's motion for a new trial. (Pff. Tr. 
221, 220, 233; Ab. 129, 131.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 26 
The court erred in overruling defendant's 
objection to the examination of Officer Hopkins 
as follows: 
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"'Q. Now. officer. did you go down 
on K Street and look over towards Third 
Avenue? 
''MR. STE'V ART: I make the fur-
ther objection that there is no proper 
foundation laid. No showing that the con-
dition and visibilitY was the same. or there 
were no obstructi~ns at the time the ac-
cident occurred which were not present 
when the witness made the observation. 
"Q. "\\Tell, officer, did you make the 
observation that I asked you, about how 
far you could see over on Third Avenue 
froEn 1C Street? 
'"MR. STEW ART: Just answer that 
yes or no. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. All right now, assuming that 
there were no obstructions at the scene 
of the accident, about how far could you 
see froEn 1C Street over on Third A venue? 
"MR. STEWART: We object to that 
as containing an improper assumption. This 
witness cannot assuEne there were no cars 
there. 
"TH~ COURT: The objection is 
overruled. 
"MR. STEW ART: I Enake the fur-
ther objection it is incompetent, irrelevant 
and immaterial, there is no proper founda-
tion laid. 
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"THE COURT: The obJection is 
overruled. 
"MR. STEWART: f make the further 
objection that the question, if answered, 
would have no probative value, there being 
no position fixed, and no basis to make it 
of any materiality. 
"The COURT: The objection is over-
ruled." (Dft. Tr. 4'3-44; Ab. 46-47.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 27 
The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's ob-
jection to defendant's cross-examination of Of-
ficer Hopkins on the following record: 
"Q. Did you ask Mr. Franz how his 
car got from point X to point C and back to 
point 2? 
"MR. BERNSTEIN: 
this as immaterial. 
We object to 
"THE COURT: The objection is sus-
tained." (Dft. Tr. 55: A b. 5L) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 28 
The court erred in refusing to discharge the 
jury and permit the answer of the witness, Gerald 
Franz, to stand and to have the question and an-
swer read by the reporter in the presence of the 
JUry, upon the following record: 
"Q. You haven't any claim against 
the defendant in this case, of any kind? 
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·'A. No sir. that was taken eare of-
"MR. STE'V ART: Just a moment. I 
take an exception to eounsel asking the 
question of the witness and answering be-
fore I can make an objection. and assign it 
as misconduct on the part of counsel and 
ask the court to discharge the jury. The 
witness started to answer and then answer-
ed the question before I had a chance to 
object. 
":MR. METOS: He didn't answer it, 
I think. 
·'MR. STEWART: He answered 
enough of it. 
"MR. MET OS: I don't want any er-
ror in this record. It may go out. 
"MR. STEW ART: After you brought 
it out, it is then too late. 
"THE COURT: Read the question. 
"MR. STEWART: Just a moment. I 
don't want the answer read right in the 
presence of the jury. 
"THE COURT: Mr. Reporter, will 
you please read the answer and the ques-
tion. 
(Question and answer read to the 
court) 
"MR. STEW ART: I take an excep-
tion to the question and answer being read. 
"THE COURT: The motion is de-
nied." (Dft. Tr. 82-83; Ab. 56-58.) 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 29 
The court erred in sustaining plaintiffs ob-
jection to the following examination of Gerald 
Franz: 
"Q. All right, you knew, as you ap-
proached Third A venue that it was your 
duty to yield the right of way to a driver 
approaching from the right if the car was 
approaching as close to the intersection as 
you were? 
"MR. MET OS: I object to that on the 
ground that it is calling for a legal con-
clusion. 
"THE COURT: The objection is 
sustained." (Dft. Tr. 104: Ab.65-66.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 30 
The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's ob-
jection to the following cross-examination of the 
plaintiff: 
"Q. Now, between you and Paul and 
Pete, at the time of Spero's death, you were 
earning about $13.00 a day, were you not? 
"MR. METOS: T object to that as 
immaterial and irrelevant and incompet-
ent and entirely prejudicial. I never asked 
this witness if they made any money or 
contributed anything to him. 
"THE COURT: The objection is 
sustained." (Dft. Tr. 148; Ab. 73-74.) 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 31 
The court erred in overruling defendant's 
objection to the cross-examination of Norma 
Chamberlain. as follows: 
"'Q. Now, Miss Chamberlain, do you 
recall testifying on April 4, t 938, right in 
this same courtroom, the same place where 
you are sitting now, in the case of the State 
of Utah vs. Kenneth Butte? 
"MR. STEW ART: I object to the 
question and assign it as an improper ques-
tion. and prejudicial misconduct. 
"MR. METOS: I just want to get 
the time and place, Your Honor. 
"MR. STEW ART: I ask the court to 
instruct the jury to disregard the question 
in the form that it was put. 
"THE COURT: The objection is 
overruled." (Dft. Tr. 195Y2 ; Ab. 95-96.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 32 
The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's ob-
jection to the following question asked the de-
fendant, Kenneth Butte: 
"Q. From the time that you saw this 
northbound coupe-when you first saw it 
-did you do everything that you, in that 
instant, thought that you could do in an 
effort to avoid an accident? 
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"MR. METOS: I object to that as 
calling for a conclusion of the witness. 
"THE COURT: The objection is 
sustained." (Dft. 229-30: Ab. 107-109.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR No. 33 
The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's ob-
jection to the following question asked of the de-
fendant, Kenneth Butte: 
"MR. STEW ART: In your opinion, 
and in your judgment, which car entered 
the intersection first, your truck or the 
coupe? 
"MR. MET OS: I object to that as 
calling for a conclusion. 
"THE COURT: The objection is 
sustained. 
"Q. In your judgment, from what 
you saw, which car entered the intersec-
tion first, your car or the northbound 
coupe? 
"MR. METOS: 'Ve object to that on 
the ground that it is calling for the con· 
elusion of this witness. The same question 
as the other. 
"THE COURT: The objection is 
sustained." (Dft. Tr. 233: Ab. 108.) 
WHEREFORE, the defendant, Kenneth 
Butte, prays that the alternative order made and 
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entered on the 2nd day of March. 1939, grunting 
the plaintiff a new trial herein be vueated and set 
aside and that the $800.00 verdict and the judg-
ment entered thereon on the 23rd day of May, 
1938, he reinstated as the verdict and judgment 
in this case. Appellant further prays that the ver-
dict of the jury and judgment entered thereon in 
the amount of $3061.00 on the 12th day of May, 
1939, he vacated, set aside and reversed and that 
this appellant have and recover his costs on this 
appeal and costs incurred in the second trial 
herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH T. STEW ART, 
GERALD IRVINE, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Kenneth Butte 
Received copy of foregoing Assignments of 
Error this 2nd day of November, 1939. 
HARRY G. METOS, 
JOE P. BOSONE, 
SAMUEL BERNSTEIN, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
(Filed November 30, 1939) 
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